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ABSTRACT  
 
  This research investigates the relationship between municipal annexation 
and local government’s financial condition. It addresses a significant gap in the 
literature by focusing on the roles of local government revenue structure and land 
use situations in affecting annexation’s fiscal implications. The major research 
question is how these two categories of local circumstances affect annexation’s 
fiscal implications, and what patterns may emerge based on the empirical 
evidence.  
With two parts of empirical analyses, I explore the features of the 
moderating effects of these two local circumstances: how the interactions between 
annexation and local circumstances influence local government’s financial 
condition.  The first part of the analyses examines the role of local government’s 
revenue structure in affecting annexation’s fiscal implications. Using a sample of 
more than six thousand municipalities, empirical analyses of OLS and interactive 
regression models show the effects of local taxing authority and revenue reliance. 
The second part underscores the effects of land use along with annexations in 
municipalities in the Phoenix metropolitan area across two decades. Utilizing GIS 
data for annexation and land use, it presents spatial patterns of annexation 
activities and land use changes. A fixed effects model with panel data is used to 
investigate the joint effects of annexation and land use on local government’s 
financial condition. The complicated effects of different land use situations are 
identified.  
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The findings suggest that annexation has the potential for fiscal gains to 
local government, but its positive fiscal effects may diminish if the municipality 
has less capability to make suitable revenue arrangement, and if a high proportion 
of land in the municipality that remains undeveloped. Above all, this research 
offers a comprehensive perspective regarding municipal annexation, land use and 
local government finance, to inform a larger debate of urban growth and local 
financial management. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement  
General-purpose local governments in the United States, including 
counties, cities, towns and townships, regulate urban growth and land use within 
their borders; and they collect local revenues to provide public goods and service, 
such as police and public education. To urban governments (cities, towns and 
townships), growth management and local public finance are two features of local 
governance which fundamentally shape urban spatial patterns, and the welfare of 
citizens.  Rapid outward sprawl and fiscal constraints of providing municipal 
services are currently two important issues that most local governments in the U.S. 
are facing. There are several different ways to achieve urban growth, such as city-
city consolidation, city-county consolidation, extra-territorial application of 
zoning, and creation of regional government structures (Carr & Feiock, 2001; 
Gallop & Landis, 1986). However, annexation by far is the primary mechanism of 
municipal boundary adjustment in most of the regions in the U.S. (Carr & Feiock, 
2001; Edwards & Xiao, 2009; Facer, 2006).  
The National League of Cities (1966) provides the most widely accepted 
definition of annexation: 
“Annexation is the addition of territory to a municipal corporation 
as an integral part. Generally, it involves joining all or part of the 
territory of an unincorporated, less populous, or subordinate local 
2 
 
unit to that of a larger unit, usually incorporated, offering a more 
complex array of municipal services…The major purpose of 
annexation is to promote orderly urban growth.” 
 
According to this definition, annexation is first of all a legal process by which 
certain territory is taken from an unincorporated local unit (usually a county) and 
added to an incorporated local unit (usually a municipality). Also, it is a process 
through which the municipality extends its services, regulations, voting privileges 
and taxing authority to new territory. Here municipality refers to subdivisions of 
counties that serve as general purpose governmental units, such as cities and 
townships. Annexation is usually initiated by the annexing municipal government, 
developers, residents, and land owners on the area to be annexed, and the 
procedure is regulated by the laws of respective states.  
Annexation has played a central role in US municipal growth for more 
than a century (Carr & Feiock, 2001). Historically, it has been pursued to offset 
the negative fiscal implications caused by the migration of middle- and upper-
income people from central cities to suburbs. Its historical significance in city 
growth has been well studied by Bollens (1949), Bromley and Smith (1973), 
Kaufman and Schnore (1975), and Klaff and Fuguitt (1978) among others. Dating 
back to the early 1800s, annexation is one of the oldest and the most common 
forms of municipal boundary change (Edwards, 2008). According to the Census 
Bureau, between 1950 and 1970, annexation accounted for 98% of the growth in 
municipal land area; for the decade between 1970 and 1979, three-fourths of the 
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461 cities with 50,000 or more residents reported boundary changes, resulting in a 
gain of 2,718 square miles (Census Bureau, 1990; ICMA, 1993).  
Although annexation activity is not as intensive and extensive as it once 
was, it continues to be a popular growth tool of local government today, and “its 
use has been central to the economic and political development of cities” (Carr& 
Feiock, 2001).  In recent decades, although municipalities in the Northeast 
generally had stable boundaries, those in the Midwest, South and West regions 
were still often modifying their boundaries through annexations. Municipal land 
areas increased substantially between 1990 and 2000 in these regions. The 
municipalities in the South experienced a 17.8% increase in land area, and 
municipalities in the West and the Midwest increased area by 13.1% and 11.4% 
respectively (Johnson, Perry, & Lollock, 2004). The most recent statistics by the 
Census Bureau shows that 61,218 annexations took place during 1990 and 2005, 
adding 7,174 square miles of lands to municipalities across the country (Census 
Bureau, 2007) (See Table 1).  
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Table 1.1  
Annexation Activities by Region (1990–2005) 
Region  Number      Population Square miles 
West       10,545 346,779 1,783 
Midwest   17,264 139,065 1,228 
South        33,341 522,723 4,161 
Northeast    68 800 2.05 
Total  61,218 1,009,367 7,174 
Note. Data sources are US Census Bureau, Boundary  and  Annexation Survey, 
1990–1999 & 2000–2005;  Edwards, 2010 
 
Similar to many other local public policy issues, annexation is never a 
simple and straightforward process. Local governments often confront the 
controversies that emerge with annexations. A large annexation may dramatically 
transform a small place into a major city, and even a small annexation may have 
great implications. To deal with annexations, practitioners need to have a range of 
skills and knowledge, such as the understanding of relevant state laws and local 
ordinances, political motivations, potential fiscal and social consequences, and 
land development information (Edwards, 2008).  
Local governments have a variety of reasons to pursue annexation. 
Annexation could be a growth management strategy which accommodates or 
controls growth; it could be a part of an overall urban development plan by 
promoting coordinated land use planning and offering fringe residents with public 
services (Edwards, 2008; Edwards & Xiao, 2009); and it could be a way to 
change the demographic and economic characteristics of the city (Austin, 1999; 
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Edwards, 2008; Jackson, 1985). Annexation is also stimulated by local economic 
interests, such as increasing and diversifying the tax base, and promoting 
economic development (Steinbauer et al., 2002). Since annexation to some extent 
prevents the emerging of new independent local governments, it is regarded to be 
“a solution to the political, social, and economic problems caused by fragmented 
governments in growing urban areas,” such as fiscal disparities and urban sprawl 
(National League of Cities, 1966). However, the dominant idea of the driver of 
annexation is that local governments pursue annexation for its perceived fiscal 
benefits (Edwards, 1999; Edwards, 2008; Liner, 1992; Rusk, 2006). Rusk (2006) 
believes that the attempt to obtain fiscal benefit is still the predominant force 
driving annexations today.  
Just as there are multiple reasons for a municipality to annex, the 
implications of annexation are complicated and far-reaching. The direct effects of 
annexation to a municipality are the gain or loss of land, people, and tax base. 
And these gains and losses often lead to heated debates and conflicts among 
parties. Based on the findings of five forums on annexation across the State of 
Indiana, Lindsey and Palmer (1998) provide a thorough categorization of the 
issues related to annexation, including political issues, economic and fiscal issues, 
administrative issues, public health, environmental, and quality of life issues, and 
miscellaneous annexation issues. Among these issues, the economic and fiscal 
issues received most attention as people during the debates commented that the 
primary motivations for annexation are economic and financial; however in 
practice the outcomes are usually not as expected (Lindsey & Palmer, 1998).  
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Annexation has profound implications on the community’s fiscal 
landscape. In local governments’ perspective, for a long time, annexation has 
been pursued to offset the fiscal stress caused by the migration of upper- and 
middle-class people away from the central cities. By annexing the fringe areas, 
the city is able to capture the residents and businesses there to increase the city’s 
tax base. Territory expansion via annexation brings revenues to a city by adding 
its tax base; meanwhile, the costs of public service expenditures are shared by 
larger and usually a more prosperous population. In this view, the marginal costs 
of services are less than the marginal revenues bought by the annexation, thus 
resulting in a fiscal surplus to the city (Muller & Dawson, 1973). As Heim (2006) 
argues in her study on “border wars” in Phoenix metropolitan area, the fiscal 
consideration is an important motivation for municipal annexation. Rusk (2006) 
achieved national attention for his argument that annexation is fiscally beneficial 
to central cities and helps small and young metropolitan areas to maintain unity. 
Elastic cities - cities pursuing more vigorous annexation policies according to 
Rusk (2003) - have healthier public finances since they have more capability to 
reap the benefits of a greater tax base.  
However, empirical research on the fiscal effects of annexation is 
inconclusive. There are opponents to the idea that annexation is fiscally beneficial 
(Knaap & Juelich, 1992). Scholars notice that due to various local circumstances, 
cities sometime are fiscally constrained because of the annexation activities 
(Breen, Costa, & Hendson, 1986). At the time of annexation, a city may hope to 
increase the tax base by the developments that will eventually take place in the 
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area. But in the short-term the city must issue bonds to pay for capital expenses, 
such as water and waste services, to the areas that are not fully developed. The 
city may annex more with the hope that the debts will be paid off by future 
development. Thus the city may put itself in financial trouble by providing 
services to the areas where the full development may never occur (Edwards, 2008; 
Edwards & Xiao, 2009). These arguments challenge the fundamental assumption 
of fiscal benefits which motivates annexation activities. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Research  
In the complex urban arena, the narrow perspective of annexation’s fiscal 
consequences is both inaccurate and unpractical (Edwards, 2008). Annexation’s 
impacts on local government finance depend to a great extent on specific local 
circumstances. The question facing local administrators is where and when 
annexation is an effective policy solution to their fiscal problems. Understanding 
the relationship between annexation and local government’s financial condition, 
and the effects of local circumstances are important because of their far-reaching 
policy implications to urban development and financial management. Examining 
the related local circumstances helps to understand both the municipality’s 
annexation behaviors and their policy consequences.  
Many studies examining broader issues of annexation infer that 
annexations’ impacts on local government finance depend to a great extent on the 
specific local circumstances surrounding their annexation activities (Breen et al., 
1986; Edwards, 1999; Edwards, 2008; Edwards & Xiao, 2009; Knaap & Juelich, 
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1992; Liner, 1992). The local circumstances range from the level and quality of 
service to the new area and to the rest of the community, proximity of the annexed 
area to central facilities; from the population and density on the area, to the type 
of development on the annexed land; from the financial structure of the local 
government, to the intergovernmental aid programs in the specific county and 
state (Edwards, 2008). However, few of the local circumstances have been 
systematically studied with proper methodologies.  
Among the multi-dimensional issues influencing the fiscal implications of 
annexation, the local government revenue structure and its land use situation are 
particularly important but remain unaddressed in the literature (Edwards, 2008; 
Lindsey & Palmer, 1998; Netzer, 2003). The local government revenue structure 
reflects the state-level constraints on the capability of local government to raise 
revenues from multiple sources, and also the local options of revenue collection. 
Under a certain revenue structure, usually defined by state laws, local government 
receives revenues through taxes, intergovernmental transfers, and other fees and 
exactions to finance public services. The revenues generated by development on 
annexed land may be related to the increased property taxes, or through the local 
sales tax, added by the retail activities on the new territories. User fees and 
charges are generally paid by residents and so basically increase or decrease with 
population changes. To the local governments which rely heavily on property tax 
revenue, annexation may be fiscally beneficial by adding additional tax bases to 
the cities; for those governments which rely mainly on sales tax and other fees 
and exactions, annexing commercial land has more significant implication to its 
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fiscal benefits (Heim, 2006; Lewis, 2001; Netzer, 2003). In addition, changes in 
intergovernmental revenues because of annexation may also depend on certain 
intergovernmental revenue formulas designed the state or federal governments 
(Edwards, 2008). Therefore, the possibility of achieving fiscal gains from 
annexation to some extent depends upon the legal framework that constrains a 
local government’s accessibility to revenue sources. However, it is a challenge to 
study this effect because of the complex feature of local government’s revenue 
structure (Pagano and Hoene, 2010). The role of two dimensions of revenue 
structures, local taxing authority and revenue reliance, are investigated in this 
research since they are closely related to local officials’ capabilities and options of 
financial management related to annexation. 
The local land use situation is another important factor affecting the 
relationship between annexation and local government’s financial condition. 
Annexation brings new lands to the municipality along with the various land uses 
on the new lands. Land use refers specifically to the different types of functions 
for which land is used, such as residential, commercial, public, and even vacant 
land, each of which reflects distinct taxation activities, and requires different 
demands and costs on public service. For instance, retail land use contributes to 
sales tax intensively, but requires much lower costs in services compared to 
residential lands (Wassmer, 2003); public land uses, such as parks, and public 
school, ask higher service costs while contribute very little to local revenues. 
Therefore, the changes in tax revenue to the annexing city may occur not only as a 
result of the additional tax bases, but also the various land uses being developed 
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on the annexed lands. Although the fiscal effects of land use are widely 
recognized, its role in the dynamics of annexation policy and local financial 
condition has not been particularly studied in the literature.  This research 
introduces land use factors into the assessment of the fiscal consequences of 
municipal annexation. 
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship 
between municipal annexation and local government’s financial conditions based 
on the data of more recent decades (1990s and 2000s). In a comprehensive 
perspective not previously considered in the literature, I consider the roles of local 
government revenue structure and land use situation in affecting annexation’s 
fiscal implications. The major question addressed is how these two categories of 
local circumstances affect annexation’s fiscal implications, and what patterns may 
emerge based on the empirical evidence. I explore the features of the moderating 
effects of these local circumstances, which are about interactions between 
annexation and these local circumstances, and how these interactions influence 
local government’s financial condition.  
As mentioned above, in the current literature, these important issues have 
not yet been systematically studied with proper methodologies. This research 
applies theories in public administration, public policy, political science, 
economics, and urban planning to explain the dynamics of municipal annexation 
as an urban growth policy; meanwhile, multiple samples of local governments are 
studied to provide empirical evidence to test the arguments being generated from 
the theories.  Overall, this research offers a comprehensive perspective regarding 
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annexation, land use and local government finance, and to inform a larger debate 
of urban growth and local finance management. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
To serve the purpose of this research, I have developed three general sets 
of research questions. The discussion above has framed the basic relationship of 
municipal annexation and local government’s financial condition, and also the 
potential roles played by local government’s revenue structure and land use 
situation. Therefore, Question Set I is about the overarching issues of the 
relationship between municipal annexation and local government’s financial 
condition. These questions will be investigated using two sets of empirical 
analyses with different datasets and methodologies. Question Set II focuses on the 
role played by local government’s revenue structure; and Question Set III 
explores the role of the land use situation on annexation’s fiscal implications to 
local governments. 
 
Question Set I: 
- What are the effects of annexation on local government’s financial 
condition? 
- What are the patterns and policy implications of the relationship between 
municipal annexation and local government’s financial condition? 
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Question Set II: 
- Does local revenue structure (including local taxing authority and local 
revenue reliance) influence local government’s annexation activities?  
- Do the features of local taxing authority and revenue reliance affect 
annexation’s fiscal implications? If they do, what are the effects?  
 
Question Set III: 
- What is the role of land use in the relationship between annexation and 
local government’s financial conditions?  In other words, are annexation’s fiscal 
implications conditional on the locality’s land use situation? 
- What are the spatial patterns of annexation activities and land uses? 
- How is annexation related to land use changes at the municipal level? 
- What are the fiscal implications of land use at the municipal level? 
 
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The next chapter reviews the 
theoretical bases and literature on the nexuses of annexation, local government’s 
revenue structure, land use, and local government’s financial condition. Based on 
the theories and current literature, a series of hypotheses are established to 
investigate the core research questions listed above. Chapter III focuses on the 
role of local government’s revenue structure in affecting annexation’s fiscal 
implications. Using a sample of more than six thousand municipalities, empirical 
analyses of OLS and interactive regression models show the complex effects of 
13 
 
local taxing authority and revenue reliance. These results are discussed to provide 
some insights on the formation of the analysis in Chapter IV. Chapter IV 
highlights the effects of land use along with annexations in municipalities in the 
Phoenix metropolitan area across two decades (1990 to 2009). Utilizing GIS data 
of annexation and land use, it presents spatial patterns of annexation activities and 
land use changes. A fixed effects panel data model is also used to investigate the 
joint effects of annexation and land use on local government’s financial condition. 
The analyses indicate no clear relationship between annexation and land use 
changes, but find “profitable” land uses are associated with positive fiscal 
consequences of annexation. Chapter V summarizes the findings from the 
empirical analyses in Chapter III and Chapter IV, and discusses theoretical and 
practical contributions, policy implications, and limitations of this research, as 
well as the future research agenda.   
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the theories and relevant literature 
concerning the nexus of municipal annexation, local revenue structure, land use 
and local government’s financial condition.  Based on these theories and the 
literature review, a series of hypotheses are established with regard to the general 
relationship between annexation and local government’s financial condition as 
well as specific concerns on the roles of local revenue structure and land use. The 
theoretical foundation and methodological advantages of this research compared 
to previous ones are summarized in the end.  
 
2.1 Relevant Theories 
There are many theories beneath the complicated process of municipal 
annexation. The long existing debate between metropolitan government 
reformists and public choice theorists has attracted most of the attention on urban 
and metropolitan boundary change issues (Edwards & Xiao, 2009). The 
metropolitan reform movement advocates regional government, city-county 
consolidation, and annexation as approaches to promote greater efficiency and 
equity at the local level. In contrast, the works of public choice theorists, 
including Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), argue that 
fragmentation is an optimal local government organizational strategy, as it fosters 
competition among local governments and allows residents to find best matches 
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to their tax and service preferences. Local governments that use annexation 
extensively to expand their influence may be less cost conscious and accountable 
to their constituents. Thus, spending and taxes may rise with annexation.  
Fleischmann (1986) in his analysis of the politics of annexation applies the 
revisions of public choice theory and also the political economy paradigm to 
explain the interactions among participants (i.e. municipalities, counties, residents, 
and land developers, etc.). In the perspective of local governments, these two 
theories are particularly applicable to explain governments’ annexation activities 
and their possible impacts on local public financial condition. Simply speaking, 
the revisions of public choice theory assume that local officials attempt to limit 
competition from other governments or to generate a per capita fiscal surplus. The 
political economy theory presumes that cities use annexation to develop property, 
capital, and stimulate economic growth. The following sections examine the 
applications of metropolitan government reform advocates, revisions of public 
choice theory, and political economy theory to the fiscal issues related to 
annexation activities. 
 
2.1.1 Metropolitan government reform advocates 
Advocacy of metropolitan government emerged as the result of annexation, 
city-county consolidation, and city-county separation experiences during the 19
th
 
century (Studenski, 1930). Metropolitan government reformists believe the 
fundamental problem of the metropolitan areas is the fragmented and 
decentralized character of local government. Fragmentation results in inefficiency 
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and ineffectiveness, and is regarded as the cause of many regional governance 
problems, such as fiscal disparity and crisis (Briffault, 1996; Gulick, 1962; Rusk, 
2003; 2006; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000; Studenski, 1930). The migration-tax 
base model of fiscal stress by Rubin (1982) attributes fiscal stress to population 
and employment outward shifts and their effects on the local government revenue 
base.  In the process of suburbanization, the selective migration of population 
from the city to outlying areas left the economically disadvantaged groups behind. 
This increases expenditure demands and erodes revenue bases of the city. One 
approach that many cities have taken is to annex its periphery to capture the 
residents and businesses that relocated outside the city. Although annexation does 
not lead to establishing metropolitan government as advocated by the reformists, 
it reduces the possibilities of new incorporations of local government. With their 
focus on central cities, reformists’ regard annexation as a solution to 
fragmentation as well as the fiscal disparities. To be specific, scholars argues that 
annexation helps to improve efficiency by achieving economies of scale, which 
reduces unit costs of government services and increases production efficiency, and 
annexation also lessen the extent of fiscal inequities across a metropolitan area 
(Edwards & Xiao, 2009; Liner, 1992; Mehay, 1981; Rusk, 1995; 2006; Stephens 
& Wikstrom, 2000).  
 
2.1.2 Revisions of public choice theory 
The public choice model has several basic assumptions: individual 
rationality, self-interest, and resource scarcity. Municipal boundaries are drawn to 
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distribute the benefits and costs of public goods to certain areas and residents 
(Ostrom, 1972). Tiebout’s (1956) well-known phrase “vote with their feet” 
describes the situation in which residents are mobile to achieve an optimal 
combination of tax and service levels. In order to attract residents, local 
governments compete with each other by offering different tax and service 
packages (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961).  However, their model failed to 
address how municipal boundaries are established or how they change 
(Fleischmann, 1986). 
Some revisions of public choice theory allow it to better accommodate the 
issue of annexation. The first revision is about mobility and the ways for residents 
to express their preferences. Sharp (1984) demonstrates that residents use both 
“exit” and “voice” to satisfy their preferences. For citizens living in 
unincorporated areas who are unhappy with taxes or services, asking a 
neighboring municipality to annex them is a way of using “voice”.  
The second set of revisions focuses on the behaviors of local government 
bureaucrats. Schneider’s (1985) bureaucratic demand models argue that 
bureaucrats have the desire to obtain control over resources, particularly fiscal and 
personnel resources. From the local bureaucrats’ point of view, to promote their 
self-interest, local governments attempt to minimize competition from other local 
governments (Schneider, 1985). If this assumption is correct, they will promote 
annexation to prevent the formation of competing service providers (new 
incorporations). As a result, the metropolitan areas become less fragmented, and 
local governments have stronger monopoly powers with expanding territories and 
18 
 
populations to reap fiscal benefits through either fiscal policies or land use 
development.     
 
2.1.3 Political economy theory 
The political economy theory views urbanization as part of a larger 
process of capitalist development in which cities provide physical space for 
production and administration (Fleischmann, 1986). In a spatial context, local 
government plays a critical role of assisting capital accumulation and legitimating 
social arrangements (Dear & Scott, 1981). Urban form is determined primarily by 
actions of the developers, realtors, land speculators, and other elements of 
property capital whose profit is linked to the specific location of growth.  Other 
types of capital, according to Cox & Nartowicz (1980) and Feagin (1982), are 
generally indifferent in terms of the specific location of growth. 
Political economy theory relates annexation with the nature of land 
development.  Land can be transformed to a variety of uses which produce wealth 
and power with appropriate “physical infrastructure and a regulatory environment” 
provided by local government (Cox & Nartowicz, 1980). Cities, particularly those 
in the same metropolitan areas, compete with each other for revenue sources and 
use annexation to capture the benefits of growth. Meanwhile, builders and 
developers are pressing local governments for capital improvements and zoning in 
exchange for new tax-producing development. Therefore, the capital of property 
redistributes its costs to local governments by playing one government off against 
another to get a better deal. In addition, residents may rely on boundary changes, 
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especially incorporation, to protect themselves from developments which threaten 
the status of their communities (Cox & Nartowicz, 1980; Molotch, 1976). 
Annexation, by absorbing these communities into incorporated jurisdictions, is 
viewed as a way to avoid the incorporation of a new city, town, or district. And 
therefore, these annexing jurisdictions capture the capital growth in property. 
Based on the assumptions of capital development, annexation may be associated 
with both high local government revenues from the capital growth in property and 
huge costs in providing services for the capital.   
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
  These theoretical traditions described above generally imply a positive 
relationship between annexation and local government’s financial condition. In 
terms of empirical work, in general, the evidence in previous studies find that 
annexation is related to positive changes in revenue levels, reliance on own-
source revenues, while the findings of expenditure changes are more mixed. The 
following sections review major previous empirical work on the fiscal 
implications of municipal annexation, and the effects of local government’s 
revenue structure and land use on annexations’ financial consequences. And a 
series of hypotheses are established according to the theories and evidence from 
the literature. 
 
2.2.1 Annexation and local government’s finance condition 
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The majority of previous studies are large-scale, multi-city studies using 
quantitative methods.  Some of the studies are dedicated to investigating 
annexation’s impacts on the general fiscal health/power of the city (e.g. Rusk, 
2006), while others consider either the local revenue or the local expenditure level 
changes associated with municipal annexation (e.g. Edwards & Xiao, 2009). They 
usually measure annexations by the area changes of the municipal territory within 
certain periods of time such as a year.  The measure of local government’s 
financial condition is more complicated. It is measured in basically two ways: one 
is using integrated indicators such as operations ratio (the ratio of total revenue to 
total expenditure) (Brown, 1993; Rivenbark & Roenigk, 2010), or city bond rating 
(Rusk, 2006); another way is using basic measurements of revenue or expenditure 
level (per capita dollar amounts from a certain source, or for a certain purpose) 
(Edwards & Xiao, 2009; MacManus & Thomas, 1979), and revenue reliance (the 
proportion of total revenues that a local government generates from one specific 
source or from several sources) (MacManus, 1977; Pagano & Hoene, 2010). 
Among the studies examining annexation’s impacts on local general 
financial condition, Rusk (2003; 2006) has attracted wide attention recently by his 
argument of “elastic cities”. He believes that the city must be “elastic” in order to 
maintain its social and economic health. By “elastic” he means being able to 
expand and develop more land. In his 2006 study, Rusk finds that the flexibility to 
annex surrounding land and communities was more important to a city’s bond 
rating (a sign of fiscal health) than the area’s poverty rate or median household 
income. Therefore, he believes annexing land is “an important route to economic 
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health and development for urban areas” (Rusk, 2006).  Earlier than that, 
MacManus and Thomas’ (1979) study on California cities concludes that 
expanding tax base through annexation improves the city’s fiscal solvency, which 
is the city’s financial independence with less reliance on outside revenues. 
Although there is no direct evidence about annexation’s impact on operations 
ratio, it is reasonable to believe that the operations ratio will be improved along 
with the increase of local government fiscal capacity through annexation 
(Edwards, 2008).  
A number of other empirical studies have focused on either the revenue 
side or the expenditure side, or on both sides of annexation’s fiscal implications. 
Cho’s (1969) multiple regression analysis of Texas cities during the 1950s finds 
that annexation is associated with moderately higher taxes and higher per capita 
expenditures for fire protection, but lower per capita expenditures for highways. 
Using similar methodology to analyze a sample of 243 central cities, MacManus 
and Thomas (1979) find that cities which annexed heavily during the 1970s had 
much lower increases in per capita taxes than those that did not annex or had only 
low to moderate changes in their land areas.  Liner (1992) conducts an analysis 
over 400 cities, and finds that annexation is negatively related to the growth of per 
capita costs in police and fire protection and municipal employment. This 
contrasts with the conclusions of the studies by Gonzalez and Mehay (1987) and 
Mehay (1981). Gonzalez and Mehay (1987) examine over 300 cities in 24 
southern and western states and find that cities with higher rates of annexation 
experience higher per capita expenditures and higher municipal taxes. Similarly, 
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in Mehay’s (1981) earlier multi-city study in California, he concludes that cities 
which grow rapidly through annexation have more rapid expenditure growth rates 
than other cities.   
Although some of the previous studies have outlying conclusions, the 
majority are generally supportive of the positive fiscal effects of municipal 
annexation, including higher bonding rating, greater fiscal solvency, and higher 
per-capita revenue level.  Based on the empirical evidence, as well as the 
theoretical arguments that annexation increases local government’s monopoly 
power to reap fiscal benefits, the overarching hypothesis which goes through this 
study is formulated as following: 
 
H1: Municipal annexation is positively associated with local government’s 
financial condition (i.e. operations ratio, debt service ratio, revenue level, and 
expenditure level).  
 
2.2.2 The role of local government’s revenue structure  
Beneath the overarching question, I focus on the roles played by two 
important local circumstances as suggested by literature. The first local 
circumstance is local government’s revenue structure which has an influence on 
annexation’s implications for local government’s financial condition.  Local 
government revenue structure in this research generally refers to the local 
authority of deriving revenues from different categories of sources, and the 
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reliance on the revenue retrieved from each of these sources. Local governments 
across the United States have generally three sources of revenues: taxes (property 
and non-property taxes), non taxes (user charges, fees, and miscellaneous 
revenues), and intergovernmental revenues (state and federal). The revenue 
structure of a municipality depends not only on its economic situation, but also on 
its institutional framework. Municipalities are constrained both legally and 
politically by the state governments in their ability to use these revenue sources. 
Therefore, revenue structure is a result of the local government’s adjustment and 
adaption to its legal and economic environment (Fisher, 2007; Pagano and Hoene, 
2010).  
However, local government’s revenue structures are too complicated for a 
broad stroke analysis. There is no one-size-fit-all municipal revenue structure 
across the nation. Historically, local governments depended almost exclusively on 
property tax revenues to fund local public services. 1 Municipal authority to tax 
property and land is one of the most powerful governance tools granted by their 
states.  Although the local taxing authority was initially designed to generate a 
stream of tax revenue from the value of property, local government revenue 
structure has diversified as the state governments enlarged the fiscal discretion of 
local governments over time (Krane, Rigos, & Hill, 2001). With the greater fiscal 
discretion and the challenge of paying for public services, municipal revenue 
profiles shifted over the past decades. The shifts resulted in greater diversification 
                                                          
1
 While this statement is true for most of the municipalities, there are a few exceptions. For 
example, cities in Oklahoma restrict the property tax to debt retirement purposes; Mesa, 
Arizona, had no property tax authority at all until late 2009 when a property tax levy was 
approved by voters. 
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in local tax structures which include sales tax, incomes tax, and non taxes, and 
thus a decrease of the relative contribution of property tax (Heim, 2007; Krane et 
al., 2001; Pagano, 2003).  
Previous studies indicate that local government revenue structure is an 
important factor influencing local government’s financial condition (Edwards, 
2008; Heim, 2006; Heim, 2007; Honadle, Costa, & Cigler, 2004; Lindsey & 
Palmer, 1998; MacManus & Thomas, 1979; Pagano, 2003; Pagano & Hoene, 
2010).  Pagano and Hoene (2010) argue that “understanding how well [a city] is 
doing does not entail a comparison to the average city but rather to the constraints 
and possibilities that uniquely affect the city’s potential revenue structure…”. 
Honadle et al. (2004) also assert that fiscal capacity and flexibility of local 
government are dependent on variety, appropriateness, and effectiveness of its 
revenue sources.  According to their argument, it is key to have authority over 
varied sources in response to the changing and increasing demands for services. 
Furthermore, they emphasize the importance of achieving an appropriate mix of 
revenues to finance services and to meet other public responsibilities in an 
equitable manner (Honadle, et al., 2004). 
Annexation’s fiscal implications are influenced by local government’s 
revenue structure in mainly three ways. First, local revenue structure has effects 
on municipal annexation behavior. Lindsey & Palmer (1998) find local 
governments are motivated to annex through their tax and fiscal policies. 
Especially when the property tax is the primary source of revenue, the annexing 
cities expect to have fiscal benefits from the newly added properties. Heim (2006) 
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links the dynamic annexation activities in Phoenix metropolitan area to the 
specific local revenue structure. She finds that the sales-tax-reliant local revenue 
structure in Arizona creates significant incentives on the competition for 
commercial land among neighboring municipalities. Other previous studies show 
the broader role of municipal fiscal structure, especially property and sales 
taxation, in shaping metropolitan growth patterns, including the spatial 
distribution of community growth and retail development in the region (e.g. 
Honadle, et al., 2004; Lewis & Barbour, 1999; Wassmer, 2003).  
Second, local revenue structure affects land use and other economic 
activities along with annexation.  Pagano (2003) in his case studies of vacant land 
finds that cities’ specific development strategies (e.g. annexation and land use 
planning) are determined by their capacity of using public resources and by the 
nature of their tax or revenue structures. He categorizes cities as property-tax 
dependent and sales- or income-tax dependent according to the proportions of 
property tax and sales or income tax in their local own-source revenues. By 
regression analysis, he finds evidence that property-tax dependent cities are more 
aggressive in strategies of boundary expansion and land development.  However, 
in contrast, Harvey and Clark (1965), in the tax payer’s perspective, argue that 
local reliance on property taxation discourages the conversion of farmland to non-
agricultural land use, because the land is subject to higher taxation once the 
development is done. 
Third, local revenue structure affects the municipality’s capability of 
collecting sufficient additional revenues to support the growing service demands 
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because of the annexed land.  Lindsey and Palmer (1998) illustrate that local 
revenues change directly because of the changes in assessed value that result from 
annexation or indirectly because of the distribution methods for particular 
revenues. Edwards (2008) in her study discusses the various sources where the 
revenues are generated from annexation: property tax, local income taxes on the 
income of new residents, or local sales tax of their consumption, and the user fees 
and charges brought by the population. Although she argues that local fiscal 
structure is one of the important local circumstances which the fiscal impact of 
annexation depends on, no particular analysis on this topic has been done in her 
study.  
Overall, little has been done in current literature to investigate whether and 
how the local revenue structure affects a municipality’s capability of improving 
its financial condition by annexation. This is echoed by Bunnell’s (1997) opinion 
on current planning literature, “surprisingly little consideration has been given to 
how changes in the structure of public finance might affect the fiscal impacts of 
development.”  I believe it is partially because of the complexity of local revenue 
structure, as there is no single dimension to effectively recognize the 
characteristics of the structure. This research will start with a categorization of 
local government’s revenue structure, and explores its interactive effects on 
annexation’s fiscal implications to the local governments with empirical evidence 
from large cross-sectional dataset. 
The local government revenue structure is a multi-faceted concept without 
a uniform definition. Based on the literature (MacManus & Thomas, 1979; Heim, 
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2007; Pagano & Hoene, 2010; Wassmer, 2003), there are two most common 
dimensions to examine the structure: the local government’s taxing authority, and 
its relative reliance on revenue sources. Through these two dimensions, I discuss 
the role of local government’s revenue structure on the relationship between 
annexation and local government’s financial condition. Two hypotheses are also 
drawn based on the discussion.  
Local taxing authority is the first dimension of local revenue structure that 
I examine. The taxing authority of local government, also called local fiscal 
authority, refers to “state’s proscribing and granting access to general taxes” for 
local governments (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). The general taxes include taxes on 
property, sales, and income. For each of these taxes, a local government is 
regarded as having the authority if it has a local control of the tax rate, and if the 
revenues from this tax are for general use (otherwise, it may be earmarked for 
certain purpose).  Krane, et al. (2001) in their study of home rule in 46 states 
summarize that local governments have the greatest discretion in their 
governmental structure and the least discretion concerning their finance. The most 
fiscally autonomous local governments would be authorized a local option for all 
three tax sources, and revenues from those sources would all be for local general 
use. Traditionally, most of the municipalities only have property tax authority 
granted by state governments. But over time, state governments have increased 
the degree of local discretion over taxing authority. Although municipalities in 
many New England states still only have access to property tax, local revenue 
sources in states in other regions are greatly diversified (Dye, 2008). 
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The normative position for taxing authority is that more local authority is 
better. It is based on the basic assumption by Pagano and Hoene (2010): “local 
governments are in the best position to ascertain both the benefits of a diverse 
revenue-raising toolkit and the implementing such tax policies.” As the economic 
base varies from municipality to municipality, I believe that local officials obtain 
the information to best match their revenue-raising tools to their economy and 
service needs. This is also the reason that no state has an imposed uniform local 
revenue and tax structure since it ignores the within-state variation of local 
economic bases and diverse spending demands.  
Linking the idea of “more local authority is better” to the issue of 
annexation, municipal governments with more taxing authority are more likely to 
make the most benefits from the boundary expansions.  As mentioned before, 
annexation adds new territories to the municipality, as well as the population, 
property, and economic activities of the new territories. Having more revenue 
sources permits local officials to exercise various choices of taxation and thus 
they are able to spread the burden of taxation across different types of economic 
activity (Krane et al., 2001).  Annexation physically puts additional economic 
activities within the expanded municipal boundary, while revenue source option 
allows the municipality to exercise the best ways of deriving fiscal benefits from 
these activities. Based this discussion, the hypothesis on the effects of local 
authority on annexation’s fiscal implications is established as following. 
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H2: Municipalities which have diversified taxing authority (more than the 
authority of property tax) are more likely to improve financial condition through 
annexation (compared to single authority municipalities). 
 
The other dimension of local revenue structure I examine in this research 
is local revenue reliance. Krane et al. (2001) distinguish the “primary source of 
municipal revenues” by comparing the percentage of total municipal revenue by 
state, and argue that local governments in the same state have quite consistent 
finance structures. Pagano and Hoene (2010) define local revenue reliance as “the 
proportion of total revenues that a local government generates from one particular 
revenue source or from several sources.”  In other words, it is about the extent to 
which a municipality relies upon certain revenue source as a share of its total 
revenues (Wassmer, 2003) or of its general revenues (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). 
As we understand, local taxing authority refers to the municipality’s 
options of revenue sources permitted by the state, while revenue reliance is about 
the actual revenue collection practices the municipality takes with these options. 
Many studies have examined local reliance on elastic and inelastic revenues 
sources, and believe it makes a difference in local government’s fiscal health 
(MacManus & Thomas, 1979; Pagano, 2003). The elasticity describes how fast 
revenues from one single source respond to changes in the underlying economy. 
Elasticity measures the extent to which a tax structure generates revenue in 
response to taxpayer income increases without changing statutory tax rates. 
30 
 
The elasticity of these revenue sources varies. Normally, the property tax 
is regarded as a typical inelastic tax. The national conversation about the fiscal 
health of cities was rooted in the basic system of property taxation and its capacity 
to generate revenues in support of public goods and services (Pagano & Hoene, 
2010). Early studies such as Netzer (1966) and Aaron (1975) find that the 
property tax does not provide the revenue elasticity to respond to the multiple 
service needs of municipalities. It is less reflective to the economy because it 
takes longer for the economic shifts to influence the real estate values which 
determine the property tax levy. Also, the assessment practice of the property and 
land values is usually not quite reflective to their market values.  In contrast, the 
sales tax and income tax are more elastic. The sales and income tax collections 
increase fairly immediately in response to shifts in consumption and employment 
or wages. One study shows that cities with the authority to tax sales and income 
generate tax revenues at a higher growth rate than property tax cities during 
expansionary economic eras (Pagano, 2003). The non taxes (user charges, fees, 
and miscellaneous revenues) are also regarded as elastic revenue sources. 
However, the property tax tends to provide more stability through the business 
cycle than sales-, income-tax, and non tax collections.  
Studies assert that optimally a combination of elastic and inelastic 
revenues sources provides municipalities with the stability to buffer against 
economic downturns, but also allows them to capture revenue growth during 
period of prosperous economy (Honadle et al., 2004; Pagano & Hoene, 2010). 
Annexation practices change the economic profile of the municipality (usually 
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increase its tax base). I argue that the elastic revenue tools are more effective in 
transforming economic benefits (if any) into fiscal benefits immediately, while 
property tax secures stable revenue from the annexed areas in the long run. 
Although there are no previous studies particularly analyzing how the diversified 
revenue structure works to reap fiscal benefits from the annexation, the features of 
the “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue tools indicate the possible fiscal results of 
municipal annexation. I hypothesize the different effects of local revenue reliance 
as follows: 
 
H3: Municipalities which have a combination of “inelastic” revenue 
source (property tax) and “elastic” revenue sources (sales tax, income tax, and 
non tax) are more likely to improve financial condition through annexation; while 
municipalities which rely on either “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue sources are 
less likely to benefit from annexation. 
 
2.2.3 The role of land use  
Land use is the result of the interaction of real-estate market and public 
policy in a mixed system. At community level, land use is a function of the 
demand for and supply of land in the community. It is guided and constrained by 
local land use planning and regulation, given state and federal laws and policies 
(Paulsen, 2004). The original land use “planners” are individuals or organizations 
who own, purchase, or sell land, and then decide how to use or improve the land. 
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Their uses of land are manifested in zoning, and include residential, retail, 
industrial manufacture, church, non-profit, farm, and even vacant lot. Public 
sector uses of land include airports, roads, schools, military, parks and recreation. 
Land use behaviors are based on the preferences, expectations, and financial 
capacities of the individuals and organizations.   
The arguments of the effects of land use consist of two layers. The first 
layer generally refers to the fiscal effects of land use on local governments; and 
the second layer is about the role of the land use in the relationship between 
annexation and local government’s financial condition. There are many previous 
studies focusing on the first layer while much fewer studies have investigated the 
relevant issues in the second layer. 
 
Land use’s fiscal effects 
The concern of land use when discussing the fiscal implications of 
municipal annexation is based on the “fiscalization hypothesis” of research on 
land use. The “fiscalization hypothesis” is two-folded. It refers to the idea that 
“the system of local public finance exerts an influence on local land use decisions,” 
(Wassmer, 2001) or “the tendency of communities to establish land use based on 
the net tax revenues they will generate for the city” (Kotin & Peiser, 1997).  Land 
use decisions become “fiscalized” when they are influenced by the expectation of 
a fiscal surplus or deficit that a particular land use generates for a community.   
  It is not a new topic that local governments seize fiscal benefits through 
land use and growth management (Ladd, 1998; Lewis, 2001; Wassmer, 2003; 
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Wassmer & Edwards, 2005). There are multiple purposes of governments’ land 
use planning and regulation (Ladd, 1998). Tools of land use planning and 
regulation have been used as mechanisms to sustain local government revenues 
and expenditures by helping to finance new infrastructures and public service. 
Early studies, such as Margolis (1957), observe that the city governments of 
residential suburbs estimate revenues and costs that arise from each possible land 
use, and then use zoning ordinances and capital improvement programs to 
encourage the fiscally most “profitable” land uses. Such studies usually find that 
commerce, industry, and high-income residences are “profitable.” Therefore, the 
local governments encourage the expansion the “profitable” land uses while 
discouraging or excluding other non-profitable uses.  Based on these current 
evidences, Hypothesis 4 is established to investigate land use’s fiscal implications: 
 
H4: A higher proportion of “profitable” land uses (e.g. commercial land) 
in a municipality is associated with better financial condition for local 
government. 
 
The hypothesis compares the fiscal implications of different land use 
compositions of a city in terms of land use types (the percentages of vacant, 
commercial, residential, and public land in the city’s total area). As indicated by 
many studies (e.g. Edwards, 1999; Lewis, 2001; Wassmer, 2003), commercial 
land provides the most tax revenue but demands relatively low costs in services; 
while public land requires service expenditures far more than revenue it brings 
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(see Appendix A for definitions). So cities and towns with higher commercial 
land use, for instance, are expected to be better off in public finance. 
 
Land use’s effects on annexation’s fiscal implications 
 The second layer of the land use arguments is about the moderating effects 
of land use on the relationship between annexation and local government’s 
financial condition. Annexing with “profitable” land is quite politically feasible to 
local governments because it allows them to get more money without creating 
new taxes or raising tax rates (MacManus &Thomas, 1979). The growth of 
metropolitan areas, usually through annexation, has brought non-uniform shifts in 
land uses within cities and thus dramatically altered the fiscal bases of city 
governments.  These arguments are usually verified in fiscal impact analyses 
using a land use multiplier approach. Breen et al. (1986) use a land-use multiplier 
approach to examine the fiscal consequence of annexation in a village in Ohio. 
Their findings differentiate types of land use showing that commercial land tends 
to have the greatest return, while residential and open space have a net fiscal loss 
to the village. There are also larger-scale case studies which cover a number of 
comparable annexation cases. Edwards (1999) evaluates the fiscal impacts of 
annexation through ten cases, which cover a mix of annexations in terms of land-
use types. The proportional valuation method she uses estimates per acre costs 
and revenues by land use, and is applied to the area of annexation to show the 
projected costs and revenues associated only with the area of annexation. The 
estimations are based on the property value of each land-use type relative to total 
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property value. However, the results find no consistent winners and losers among 
cities and towns in each annexation. Annexation can be either fiscally desirable or 
undesirable for both communities due to the land use variation.   
To consider a municipality as a whole, annexation changes its land use 
composition, and thus results in its specific financial condition. Theoretically 
speaking, local governments compete with each other for the most “profitable” 
land (Fleischmann, 1986).  However, when annexation is used as a tool for future 
growth management, the government usually is willing to add other land use 
types such as vacant and agriculture land. In this case, the annexation’s 
contribution to local government finance will not be so predictable. When other 
factors are controlled, different compositions of a municipality’s land use 
(percentages of land use types) are expected to have different influences on 
annexation’s fiscal consequences. The fifth hypothesis is formed as following:  
 
H5: Annexation’s effects on a local government’s financial condition 
depend on the land use situation of the municipality.  
 
 This hypothesis makes two implicit assumptions. First, the relationship 
between annexation and local government’s financial condition is more likely to 
be positive when the municipality has bigger proportion of “profitable” land uses 
(e.g. commercial land and residential land), and second, vice versa. In other words, 
the land use composition of a municipality moderates the relationship between 
annexation and local government’s financial condition.  
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2.3 Summary 
In summary, theories and previous studies imply a positive relationship 
between annexation and local government’s financial condition in general. 
However, it is not conclusive since there are also studies which draw the opposite 
conclusion. The mixed results are somehow due to the ignorance of the effects of 
local circumstances, particularly the local government revenue structure and land 
use situation. These factors potentially play important roles in the relationship 
between annexation and local government’s financial condition. Compared to the 
great volume of literature on municipal annexation’s fiscal implications, there is 
less research examining the dynamics of local government revenue structure and 
land use composition of the city.  
The inconclusive research findings are also due to the specific samples 
and methodologies being used. Both previous generalized studies and case studies 
to some extent suffer from methodological problems, rendering the results 
questionable. Statistical methods in multi-city studies are better in examining 
situations in which behavior is assumed homogeneous and routine, and therefore 
easier to generalize. Case studies produce much more detailed information than 
what is available through a multi-city statistical analysis. However, case studies 
are difficult to generalize because of inherent subjectivity and also because they 
are mainly based on qualitative subjective data, the findings can be applied only 
to particular contexts. Also, many of the studies are dated and examine 
annexations that happened in the 1960s, 1970s, or the 1980s.  
This research proceeds to investigate effects of local government revenue 
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structure and land use which are under addressed in current literature of municipal 
annexation’s fiscal implications. To avoid the disadvantages of a single 
methodology, this research employs cross-sectional regression analysis with a 
nation-wide sample of municipalities, as well as panel data analysis focusing on a 
group of geographically concentrated municipalities (i.e. Phoenix metropolitan 
area). GIS mapping is also used to present spatial changes of annexation, land use, 
and their interactions.  In addition, all the datasets being used are not earlier than 
1990 which helps to produce more recent and relevant research findings.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S REVENUE STRUCTURE: A 
NATION-WIDE STUDY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirically investigates the effects of municipal annexation 
on local government’s financial condition. The chapter starts with a brief 
introduction of the research purposes, major questions, and the hypotheses to test. 
The next sections present the data and methodology with the cross-sectional 
regression models which specify local government’s financial condition as a 
function of annexation, local revenue structure, and other institutional, and socio-
economic variables. This is followed by the descriptive statistics, results of 
regression analysis, and a concluding discussion.   
There are two major purposes for this research: to present the general 
trend of annexation’s fiscal implications using a nation-wide sample of 
municipalities with a variety of characteristics; and to investigate the effects of 
local revenue structure in the relationship between annexation and local 
government’s financial condition. As mentioned in Chapter I, this part of 
empirical analysis firstly addresses the overarching research question: what are 
the effects of annexation on local government’s financial condition?  Focusing on 
the role of local revenue structure, this chapter also explores a series of specific 
questions: does local revenue structure (including local taxing authority and local 
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revenue reliance) influence local government’s annexation activities? Do the 
features of local taxing authority and revenue reliance affect annexation’s fiscal 
implications? If they do, what are the effects?  
This part of empirical work employs the multi-city cross-sectional 
regression analysis to test three hypotheses as presented in the previous chapter: 
H1: Municipal annexation is positively associated with local government’s 
financial condition; H2: Municipalities which have diversified taxing authority 
(more than the authority of property tax) are more likely to improve financial 
condition through annexation (comparing to single authority municipalities); and 
H3: Municipalities which have a combination of “inelastic” revenue source 
(property tax) and “elastic” revenue sources (sales tax, income tax, and non tax) 
are more likely to improve financial condition through annexation; while 
municipalities rely on either “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue sources are less likely 
to benefit from annexation. 
   
3.2 Models 
Guided by the literature (see Chapter II) and for the purpose of testing the 
three hypotheses, cross-sectional regression models  are developed as follows. 
Model 1 is the base model investigating the general fiscal effects of annexation. 
 
                                    -- (1) 
 
40 
 
where          is substituted by several local financial condition variables, 
including Operations ratio, Debt service ratio, Per-capita total revenues, and 
Per-capita own-source revenues. The details of these variables will be explained 
in next section. Each of the parameters is defined as the percentage change 
between 1992 and 2002. The annexation variable        is defined as the percent 
change in area of a municipality between 1990 and 2000. The other independent 
variables,    , include a series of policy and socio-economic characteristics of 
the municipality that will be explained in next section (see Table 3.2).  
To explore the role of local government revenue structure as specified in 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, Model 2, an interactive model is developed with 
the foci on the effects of local taxing authority and local revenue reliance.  
 
                                                        
                                         -- (2) 
 
 
Model 2 keeps the same cross-sectional structure as in Model 1, and four 
key variables for local government revenue structure are added in the model. 
           identifies the taxing authority of the municipality by dummy.  Pagano 
and Hoene (2010) categorize two major situations of municipal taxing authority: 
property tax authority only, and diversified authorities over property tax as well as 
one or two other taxes. I hypothesize that the later situation is more likely to 
associate with better financial condition through annexation (see Hypothesis 2). 
Another key independent variable is           which is also a dummy variable 
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describing the municipality’s reliance on revenue sources. According to 
Hypothesis 3, I divide municipalities into two types of          : those 
municipality has a combination of “inelastic” revenue source (property tax) and 
“elastic” revenue sources (sales tax, income tax, and non tax) , and those relying 
on either “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue sources otherwise. And I hypothesize the 
former ones are more likely to improve their financial conditions by annexation.  
In addition, two interaction terms of annexation variable and local revenue 
structure variables are also included in this model:                   and 
                . According to Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, municipalities’ 
responses to and fiscal achievements from annexation are affected by their 
revenue structures (both taxing authority and revenue reliance). These two 
interactions are used to explore how annexation’s fiscal implications vary in 
municipalities with different taxing authority and revenue reliance situations. 
Model 2 is called an interactive model according to Kam and Franzese (2007) as 
it investigates the interactions between key variables; in other words, how does 
one key variable’s effect on dependent variable depend on the values of other key 
variables. To facilitate the interpretation of this interactive model, all the 
continuous dependent and independent variables are centered on their means.
2
 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
                                                          
2
 Mean centering makes coefficients easier to interpret, reduces multi-collinearity 
(Cronbach 1987), and it doesn’t affect substance of results (e.g., R2 is unaffected) (Young, 
2006). 
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 This research employs the 1990 and 2000 data for a sample of 6069 
general purpose municipalities with population greater than 1,000. This sample is 
a result of several steps of data processing with the datasets from multiple 
sources (see Appendix A for details). These municipalities have had various 
practices of annexation during the decade such that 1967 of them had no 
boundary changes while 1260 of them annexed over 25% of their 1990 land 
areas (see Table 3.1). Like annexation, most of the other parameters are defined 
as the percentage change between 1990 and 2000, except the dummy variables. 
However, the financial condition variables are created based on 1992 and 2002 
datasets from the Census of Governments, instead of the 1990 and 2000 datasets. 
So there is a two year lag created between the dependent variables and 
independent variables. The time lag also reflects the fact that the effects of 
annexation take time to have any impact. The data sources and measurement of 
dependent variables and explanatory variables are presented below. 
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Table 3.1 
Extent of Annexation by City Size (1990-2000) 
Population Size 
Small  
(1,000-10,000) 
Medium  
(10,000-100,000) 
Large  
(100,000 and over) 
 
% N % N % N 
Non Annexers 33.10 1,366 29.38 547 29.51 54 
Light Annexers 21.23 876 24.92 464 36.61 67 
Moderate Annexers 25.27 1043 24.60 458 20.22 37 
Heavy Annexers 20.40 842 21.11 393 13.66 25 
Total 100 4,127 100 1,862 100 183 
Note. During the period 1990-2000, Non Annexers annexed no land; Light Annexers 
annexed less than 5% of their 1990 land areas; Moderate Annexers annexed between 5% 
and 25% of their 1990 land areas; Heavy Annexers annexed over 25% of their 1990 land 
areas. 
 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are indicators of local government financial 
condition. There are a number of financial dimensions and indicators that have 
been used over the past decades for analyzing, interpreting, and communicating 
financial condition of local government.  These measurements range from simple 
per capita indicators (such as MacManus & Thomas,1979; Edwards & Xiao, 2009) 
to ICMA’s over 40 financial and environmental indicators which monitor financial 
condition, and take into account the characteristics of time, environment, 
multidimensional relationships, and implicit and explicit obligations 
(Nollenberger, Groves, & Valente,  2003).  According to Groves, Godsey, & 
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Shulman (1981), complex dimensions and indicators make it difficult to 
communicate financial condition to a broad range of stakeholders.  To facilitate 
effective interpretations, this study limits the number of indicators being used for 
analyzing financial condition.  
 Of primary interest in our research are the measures of local 
government’s ability to raise revenues from multiple sources to finance public 
services. These measures ought to be easily understood by local practitioners. 
Based on this rationale and the data availability, four indicators are used. The first 
two are basic per capita indicators of local government revenues, Per-capita total 
revenues, and Per-capita own-source revenues. The other two indicators of local 
government’s financial condition are Operations Ratio (=total revenues/total 
expenditures), and Debt Service ratio (=total interest payment to debt/ total 
expenditures). They have been conceptualized in previous studies (Brown, 1993; 
Hendrick, 2004; Rivenbark, Roenigk, & Allison, 2009; Rivenbark & Roenigk, 
2010; Wang, Dennis, & Tu, 2007) (see Table 3.2).  
To develop these measurements, I relied on data from the Census of 
Governments -Finances of Municipal and Township Governments (1992 & 2002). 
The 2002 data are converted to 1992 US dollar value to adjust for the inflation. 
And then the percentage change between 1992 and 2002 are calculated as the 
dependent variables for the models.  
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Table 3.2  
Dependent Variables: Indicators of Local Government’s Financial Condition  
Financial 
Dimension   
Description & Calculation Interpretation 
Per-capita total 
revenue 
The basic measurement of municipal revenue 
status. 
Total revenues divided by population 
  
Per-capita own-
source revenues 
The basic measurement of municipal own-
source revenue status.  
Total revenues from municipal own sources 
divided by population 
  
Operations ratio 
Addresses whether government’s annual 
revenues were sufficient to pay for annual 
operations. 
Total revenues divided by total expenditures 
(plus transfers to debt service fund and less 
proceeds from capital leases and installment 
purchases) 
Ratio of 1.0 or 
higher indicates 
that government 
lived within 
annual revenues. 
Debt service 
ratio 
Addresses service flexibility, or amount of 
expenditures committed to annual debt 
service. 
Debt service ratio (Total interest payments on 
long-term debt, including transfers to debt 
service fund) divided by total expenditures 
plus transfers to debt service fund  
Service 
flexibility 
decreases as 
more 
expenditures are 
committed to 
annual debt 
service 
Note. All the indicators are revisions of Hendrick, 2004; Rivenbark, Roenigk, & Allison, 
2009; & Rivenbark & Roenigk, 2010 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
For the key explanatory variable,        , data are calculated based on 
municipal boundary GIS data 1990 and 2000 from the National Historical 
Geographic Information System (NHGIS, 2011).  The annexation variable 
       is defined as the percent change in area of a municipality between 1990 
and 2000.  
46 
 
The variables of local taxing authority and revenue reliance are based on 
multiple data sources. I take several steps to create these two parameters. The 
taxing authority is distinguished by state. Our data source is the categories of 
revenue authority categories by Pagano and Hoene (2010). As mentioned before, 
           is denoted as “1” if the municipality has diversified authority over 
property tax and other taxes, and “0” if the municipality is authorized to use only 
the property taxation as a tax source. Diversified authority includes municipal 
taxing authorities over “property, sales”, “property, income”, and “property, sales, 
& income” in Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) categories. 
The municipal revenue reliance generally is also a product of state laws. 
Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) categories of revenues reliance by state provide 
guides to establish our reliance variable. However, the variety of municipal 
revenue reliance within a state should not be ignored (Honadle et al., 2004; Krane 
et al., 2001). With the increasing local discretion on revenue collection, 
municipalities have developed a variety of revenue structures to cope with their 
specific political and economic circumstances.  Therefore, it is not accurate to 
define a municipality’s revenue structure based on the state it belongs to. Instead, 
I identify the revenue reliance of each municipality with public finance data from 
the Census of Governments (1992 and 2002). I use mean and standard deviation 
statistics to determine the categories of revenue reliance of each municipality.  I 
firstly calculate the percentage share of total revenues from an individual tax 
source. I define a municipality as property tax reliant if the share of property tax is 
one standard deviation above the mean. Using the same methods I identified 
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municipalities which reliant on “elastic” revenue sources including sales, income 
taxes and non taxes.           is denoted as “0” for both of these two types of 
municipalities, and “1” for other municipalities which are regarded to have a 
balanced combination of “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue sources. As a result, 
6069 municipalities are identified as being in consistent revenue reliance 
categories in both 1992 and 2002.  The dummy variable            is denoted as 
“1” if the municipality has no significant reliance on either “inelastic” revenue 
source (property tax) and “elastic” revenue sources (sales tax, income tax, and 
non tax) but a combination of both, and “0” if it significantly reliant on certain 
source(s).  Please also see Appendix A for the details of data processing. 
In addition, eleven control variables (   ) are also included in the 
estimations. First, two state annexation policy variables,         and        are 
included.          describes whether state law requires the annexing 
municipality to do an impact report to examine the fiscal impacts of annexation.
3
  
      is about whether the state calls for service plans as part of the municipal 
annexation process. Service plans are required in 20 states,
4
 and they usually ask 
for a schedule with timelines for extending service to the newly annexed areas. I 
believe, with these two state law requirements, annexing municipalities are more 
prudent in their decisions of annexation, and more strategic in economic 
development and service delivery in the newly annexed area. So I expect positive 
                                                          
3
 Impact report of annexation exists in seven states: Kentucky, North Carolina, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. 
4
 They are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.  
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effects of these two dummy variables in our estimates. Also considered are two 
state fiscal policy variables:         and               denotes whether the 
municipality is constrained by state-imposed Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs), 
and     is about whether the municipality is required to balance annual budget 
(see details of the definition in Table 3.2). I  expect that municipalities with 
balanced budget requirements but without TELs are better off in their financial 
condition. Other control socio-economic variables include density, median 
household income, percentage of population 25 or older with at least some college 
education, percentage of housing units being occupied, poverty rate, percentage of 
Non Hispanic white population, and whether the municipality is a central city. All 
these variables are presented as percentage change between 1990 and 2000, 
expect for the dummy variables. And all of them, except for the poverty rate and 
central city dummy, are expected to have a positive relationship with local 
government’s financial condition. Most of the data for control variables are 
compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau (1990, 2000). All together, they are meant to 
provide a comprehensive examination into the effects of annexation and local 
government finance structure on municipal financial condition. The details of the 
variables are provided in Table 3.3. 
  
49 
 
Table 3.3 
Definitions, Measurements and Sources of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Definition & measurement Sources 
AREA 
Percentage change in area because of 
annexation (1990-2000) 
NHGIS, 2011 
AUTHORITY 
Dummy variable of 1 if the municipality has 
diversified taxing authority  
Pagano & Hoene, 
2010 
RELIANCE 
Dummy variable of 1 if the municipality has 
combination of “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue 
sources 
Census of 
Governments, 
1992 & 2002; 
Pagano & Hoene, 
2010 
NOTELS 
Dummy variable of 1 if the municipality has no 
tax and expenditure limits (TELs) of any kind 
Pagano & Hoene, 
2010 
BB 
Dummy variable of 1 if the municipality is 
required to balance annual budget 
Krane, Rigos & 
Hill, 2001 
IMPACT 
Dummy variable of 1 if impact report is 
required for annexation 
Steinbauer et al., 
2002 
PLAN 
Dummy variable of 1 if service plan is required 
for annexation 
Steinbauer et al., 
2002 
DENS 
Percentage change in persons per square mile 
(1990-2000) 
Census Bureau 
EDU 
Percentage change in percentage of population 
25 or older with at least some college 
education(1990-2000) 
Census Bureau 
OCC 
Percentage change in percentage of housing 
being occupied (1990-2000) 
US Dept. of 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
HHINC 
Percentage change in median household income 
(1990-2000) 
Census Bureau 
POV Percentage change in poverty rate (1990-2000) Census Bureau 
NHWHT 
Percentage change in percentage of Non 
Hispanic white population (1990-2000) 
Census Bureau 
CENTRAL 
Dummy variable of 1 if the municipality is 
central city 
Census Bureau 
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3.4 Descriptive Analysis  
 Two parts of the descriptive analysis are conducted. The first part is the 
descriptive statistics of the variables being included in the regression models; and 
the other part presents t-tests of the annexation and financial features of the 
municipalities with different revenue structures.  Table 3.4 below provides an 
overview of the characteristics of both dependent and independent variables.  
Table 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Definition   Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
TREV 
Percentage change in per-capita total 
revenue 
0.551 0.763 
OTREV 
Percentage change in per-capita total 
revenue from own sources 
0.561 0.842 
OR Percentage change in operations ratio 0.053 0.544 
DSR Percentage change in debt service ratio 0.644 2.628 
AREA 
Percentage change in area because of 
annexation  
0.185 0.648 
AUTHORITY Diversified taxing authority  0.732 0.443 
RELIANCE 
Reliance on both “inelastic” and 
“elastic” revenue sources 
0.452 0.498 
AREA*AUTHORITY Interaction of AREA and AUTHORITY 0.134 0.579 
AREA*RELIANCE Interaction of AREA and RELIANCE 0.088 0.476 
NOTELS 
No tax and expenditure limits (TELs) of 
any kind 
0.119 0.324 
BB Balanced annual budget required 0.409 0.491 
IMPACT Impact report required for annexation 0.187 0.39 
PLAN Service plan required for annexation 0.507 0.499 
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DENS 
Percentage change in persons per square 
mile  
0.017 0.614 
EDU 
Percentage change in percentage of 
population 25 or older with at least 
some college education 
0.394 0.538 
OCC 
Percentage change in percentage of 
housing units being occupied 
0.006 0.052 
HHINC 
Percentage change in median household 
income 
0.102 0.139 
POV Percentage change in poverty rate 0.015 0.511 
NHWHT 
Percentage change in percentage of Non 
Hispanic white population 
-0.075 0.14 
CENTRAL Central city 0.066 0.248 
 Note. For definition, every variable is presented as percentage change of the value 
between 1990 and 2000 (or 1992 and 2002 for dependent variables), except the dummy 
variable of AUTHORITY, RELIANCE, NOTELS, BB, IMPACT, PLAN, and 
CENTRAL. 
 
In addition, I examine the differences of means of the annexation and 
financial features between the municipalities in different categories of local taxing 
authority and revenue reliance.  I use independent sample t-test to compare their 
means (see Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). In both sets of comparisons, I find no 
significant differences in the extent of annexation between cities with different 
taxing authority or revenue reliance. It suggests that the local revenue structure 
doesn’t significantly influence municipality’s annexation behavior. However, 
local government financial condition variables show significant differences in 
means between each of the two categories of municipalities. T statistics in Table 
3.5 shows that municipalities with diversified taxing authority have had 
significantly more increases from 1990 to 2000 in the per-capita total revenues, 
and operations ratio, and significantly less increase in debt service ratio (which is 
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also a positive sign) than those municipalities with single taxing authority. Results 
in Table 3.6 shows that municipalities which rely on a balanced combination of 
“inelastic” and “elastic” sources have had significantly more positive changes in 
per-capita total revenues, per-capita own-source revenues, and less positive 
changes in debt service ratio than other municipalities.  
 
Table 3.5 
Difference of Means: Municipalities with Diversified Taxing Authority vs. 
Municipalities with Single Taxing Authority   
Variable Diversified Authority  t statistic Single Authority 
 
N Mean 
 
N Mean 
AREA 4483 0.185 -0.701 1586 0.195 
TREV 4325 0.562 1.763* 1619 0.523 
OTREV 4354 0.567 0.893 1620 0.547 
OR 4499 0.059 1.627* 1656 0.034 
DS 2739 0.553 -3.317*** 1150 0.859 
Note. * p<0.1, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3.6 
Difference of Means: Municipalities with Balanced Sources vs. Other 
Municipalities  
Variable Balanced Reliance t statistic Other Reliance 
 
N Mean   N Mean 
 
AREA 2772 0.192       0.848 3297 0.178 
TREV 2669 0.654 9.434*** 3275 0.468 
OTREV 2692 0.648 7.266*** 3282 0.490 
OR 2781 0.063 1.230 3374 0.045 
DS 1578 0.537 -2.106** 2311 0.717 
Note. ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3.5 Results  
Two models are estimated for each of the four indicators of local 
government’s financial condition (Operations ratio, Debt service ratio, Per-
capita total revenue, and Per-capita own-source revenues). Prior to the regression 
analyses, tests of correlation and multi-collinearity are performed on all 
independent variables to avoid invalid results or variable redundancy.  
Model 1 is the base model which does not take into consideration the 
effects of local government revenue structure. Table 3.7 below presents the 
regression results for Model 1 with four dependent variables listed by column. 
The number of observations varies cross columns due to missing data problems. 
These results illustrate the general relationships between annexation and these 
financial indicators. 
Generally, the estimates support the idea that municipal annexation is 
associated with local government’s financial condition. The annexation parameter 
Area is positively and significantly associated with Per-capita total revenues and 
Per-capita own-source revenues, which is consistent to what I address in 
Hypothesis 1. However, there are also complex findings of the effects of 
annexation: it does not have significant impacts on Operations ratio, but is 
significantly associated with positive change in Debt service ratio. Great debt 
service ratio is a negative indicator of financial condition as it means a high 
expense on the interest payments on debt, and as a result, less local financing 
capability for public service. A possible explanation of this phenomenon would be 
that municipalities practicing aggressive annexation are more likely to invest in 
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public capital projects to meet the increasing public service demands. When they 
finance the investments through borrowing, the local expenditure on debt service 
rises.  Thus, reflected in our estimates, annexation is associated with significant 
positive changes of the debt service ratio of the municipality. 
The estimates of Model 2, the interactive model, highlight the effects of 
local revenues structure variables and the interactions. The results are shown in 
Table 3.8. Reliance doesn’t have significant relationships with the financial 
condition indicators across the columns, while Authority is significantly and 
negatively associated with Debt Service ratio and positively associated with Per-
capita total revenues, both of which indicate positive fiscal effects of diversified 
taxing authority for a municipality. Annexation generally is found to impact 
positively on Operations ratio and Per-capita own-source revenues. 
What are more interesting are the significant effects of some of the 
interaction terms in these estimates. As mentioned before, interactions are used to 
investigate how the different taxing authority and revenue reliance influence 
annexation’s fiscal implications to a municipality. In these interactive models, the 
coefficients of Area across the columns represent only one effect annexation may 
have, that is, the effect of annexation when Authority and Reliance are both kept 
at “0”. In other words, these coefficients show the relationships between 
annexation and the financial condition indicators for those municipalities with 
taxing authority over single revenue source (Authority=0), and is only reliant on 
either “elastic” or “inelastic” revenues sources (Reliance =0). For municipalities 
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other than this type, the estimated effects of annexation should be recognized 
based on both the coefficient of Area and the coefficients of the interactive terms. 
Significant effects of these two interactions are found across the estimates. 
I employ the differentiation method suggested by Kam and Franzese (2007) to 
interpret the interactive effects. For example, in our estimate of Operations ratio 
(the first column), both Area and the interactions (Area*Authority and 
Area*Reliance) are found to have significantly positive effects. They indicate 
there are four effects annexation may have on the dependent variable. For those 
municipalities with taxing authority over single revenue source (Authority=0, thus 
Area*Authority=0) and rely on either “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue sources 
(Reliance=0, thus Area* Reliance=0), every percentage increase in area is 
associated with 3.7% increase of Operations ratio from 1992 to 2002 while other 
variables are held constant; for municipalities with diversified taxing authority, 
and rely on either “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue sources (Authority=1, and 
Reliance=0), annexation is also positively associated with the Operations ratio, 
but with a greater effect, in that every percentage increase in area is associated 
with 7.5% increase of Operations ratio during the decade;
5
 for municipalities with 
single taxing authority, and rely on a balance of “inelastic” or “elastic” revenue 
sources (Authority=0, and Reliance=1), every percent increase in area is 
                                                          
5
                                                         
               , when               So the coefficient for        is 0.075 in this 
condition. 
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associated with 7.6% increase of Operations ratio; 
6
 and for municipalities with 
both diversified taxing authority, and rely on a balance of “inelastic” or “elastic” 
revenue sources (Authority=1, and Reliance=1), one percentage area change is 
linked to 11.4% increase in Operations ratio.
7
 
Similar significant positive effects of the Area*Authority are found in the 
estimate of Per-capita total revenues-own-sources. However, in the estimate of 
Per-capita total revenues, annexation is not found to be a significant factor, but 
the interaction Area*Reliance has significant positive effect. They indicate that 
only for municipalities with a balance of “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue sources 
(Reliance=1), annexation is positively associated with the Per-capita total 
revenues, for other municipalities, annexation’s effect is insignificant.  
For control variables, some significant relationships are also identified. 
The fiscal policy variables NOTELS (no TELs) and BB (balanced budget), as well 
as state annexation law variables IMPACT (impact report) and PLAN (service 
plan), have generally positive effects on municipal financial condition but with a 
few exceptions (For example, balanced budget is related to decrease in Operation 
ratio, and increase in Debt service ratio). The other socio-economic variables 
generally present the effects as expected. Some of them show strong differential 
effects, for example, central city (CENTRAL) has negative changes in all the four 
                                                          
6
                                                        
               , when              So the coefficient for        is 0.076 in this 
condition. 
7
                                                              
                                 , when              and              
So the coefficient for        is 0.114 in this condition. 
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financial condition indicators compared to suburban and rural cities and towns 
during 1990 and 2000. 
 
  
Table 3.7   
Results for the Estimates: Base Models  
 
Per-capita total 
revenues 
Per-capita own-source 
revenues Operations ratio Debt service ratio 
AREA  0.014   (0.016) 0.174*** (0.044) 0.001 (0.013) 0.674*  (0.385) 
NOTELS 0.057** (0.029) 0.026  (0.029) 0.048** (0.020) -0.034  (0.180) 
BB -0.005  (0.035) 0.138*** (0.038) -0.037 (0.026) 0.423*** (0.143) 
IMPACT -0.024  (0.031) 0.136*** (0.037) 0.010 (0.020) -0.054 (0.184) 
PLAN 0.028  (0.029) 0.113*** (0.038) 0.049*  (0.026) 0.108 (0.124) 
DENS -0.001 (0.003) 0.012 (0.007) 0.001 (0.001) -0.017 (0.015) 
EDU -0.090*** (0.026) 1.119*** (0.060) 0.021 (0.017) 0.055 (0.262) 
OCC 0.778*** (0.290) 0.884 (0.379) -0.268 (0.191) -5.849*** (1.673) 
HHINC 0.611***  (0.198) 0.569*** (0.197) 0.086 (0.138) -0.055 (0.788) 
POV -0.006 (0.020) 0.147 (0.030) 0.012 (0.016) 0.050 (0.176) 
NHWHT 0.085  (0.160) 0.187** (0.088) 0.058 (0.059) -1.329*** (0.434) 
CENTRAL -0.109*** (0.025) -0.136*** (0.034) -0.111*** (0.024) -0.643 (0.139) 
5
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INTERCEPT 0.162***(0.026) -0.012(0.029) 0.019***(0.016) 0.675***(0.177) 
N   5892 5460 6048  3858 
R-square   0.090 0.439 0.073  0.034 
  Note. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses.
5
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Table 3.8  
Results for the Estimates: Interactive Models 
 
Per-capita total 
revenues 
Per-capita own-source 
revenues Operations ratio Debt service ratio 
AREA 0.025  (0.022) 0.117**  (0.055) 0.037***  (0.014) 0.389  (0.298) 
AUTHORITY 0.064**  (0.031) -0.057 (0.042) 0.026  (0.023) -0.269**  (0.104) 
RELIANCE 0.002  (0.039) 0.003  (0.049) -0.020 (0.031) -0.009 (0.088) 
AREA*AUTHORITY 0.038  (0.024) 0.013**  (0.094) 0.038**   (0.019) -0.345 (0.298) 
AREA*RELIANCE 0.039** (0.038) 0.120 (0.109) 0.039*  (0.029) 0.611(0.378) 
NOTELS 0.048* (0.026) 0.018  (0.027) 0.046** (0.019) -0.011  (0.100) 
BB -0.001  (0.029) 0.135*** (0.032) -0.038*  (0.022) 0.254**  (0.087) 
IMPACT -0.037  (0.027) 0.122 **(0.036) 0.009 (0.020) -0.106(0.137) 
PLAN 0.037  (0.029) 0.121** (0.044) 0.058**  (0.028) 0.117  (0.076) 
DENS 0.001  (0.003) 0.013 (0.008) 0.003*  (0.001) -0.004 (0.009) 
EDU -0.088** (0.027) 1.112*** (0.059) 0.025   (0.017) 0.053 (0.164) 
OCC 0.725** (0.276) 0.926 (0.368) -0.226   (0.174) -4.406*** (1.223) 
6
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HHINC 0.622** (0.198) 0.597** (0.192) 0.085  (0.136) -0.243 (0.420) 
POV -0.010  (0.020) 0.143 (0.030) 0.012  (0.017) 0.018(0.118) 
NHWHT 0.070 (0.169) 0.191** (0.085) 0.042   (0.060) 0.646**   (0.302) 
CENTRAL -0.105* (0.024) -0.133*** (0.033) -0.109*** (0.023) -0.329*** (0.079) 
INTERCEPT 0.201*(0.029) 0.027 (0.034) 0.039**(0.017) 0.523*(0.104) 
N 5892 5460 6048 3810 
R-square  0.097 0.441 0.077 0.048 
Note. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  Robust standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses.
6
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3.6 Discussion 
Understanding the fiscal implications of annexation is important to 
municipal planning, financial management, and service delivery. This study 
examines annexation in a multivariate context using municipal-level data. 
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are all partially verified in our analyses. The base model 
shows annexation has various effects on different aspects of local government 
financial condition. It is associated with rise in per-capita total revenues-own 
sourced, but is also related to higher debt service ratio as a financing obligation. 
With many dynamic forces surrounding annexation activity nowadays, the narrow 
perspective on the fiscal effects of annexation masks many facts of local 
government’s planning and financial management.   
This research underscores the important role of local revenue structure in 
the relationship between annexation and local government’s financial condition. 
Careful analysis of the variables in the interactive model reveals that the net fiscal 
outcome of annexation depends on the options and arrangements the municipality 
has in revenue collection, holding policy and socio-economic variables constant. 
Though there are exceptions, I generally find that municipalities with diversified 
taxing authority and/or with a balance of “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue sources 
are more likely to have improved their financial conditions through annexation. 
These municipalities present greater capabilities of retrieving fiscal benefits from 
the new territory and financing the increased public service demands in an 
effective manner.  For other municipalities, the limited and inflexible taxing 
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authority and revenue reliance might have counteracted the efficiency benefits 
gained from annexation.  
Although these analyses reveal important dynamics among annexation, 
local revenue structure and local government’s financial condition, many 
questions remain.  Limited by data availability, I am unable to do analyses with a 
longitudinal nation-wide sample, but a snapshot of the differences between 1990 
and 2000. The various changes in financial condition and socio-economic 
situations within the 10 years are mostly unknown. The measures of local 
revenues structure are broad and are only approximations of fiscal behaviors of 
the municipalities. For example, just because some municipalities have more 
options as to sources of revenues does not mean they would aggressively raise 
more revenue. They examine the administrative costs and political feasibility 
prior to adopting or expanding revenue and taxing authority. The actual 
arrangement of revenue collection could be far more complicated.  Even with the 
same local revenue structure, there are still many variations of local circumstances 
related to the actually fiscal results of annexation.  
A practical question that arises beyond the role of local revenue structure 
is the effect of actual planning or development outcomes in areas that are annexed. 
Previous studies argue that the fiscal consequences are not only brought about by 
area expansion, but also by the fiscal activities in the new areas (Edwards, 2008; 
Edwards & Xiao, 2009). Further research on the specific circumstance of the 
developments along with annexation is necessary to better understand the fiscal 
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issues of annexation.  In this sense, land use is a proper reflection of the 
developments and economic activities on the annexed areas.  
To investigate the role of land use, and also avoid similar data and 
methodological weakness in this chapter, another empirical analysis with different 
dataset and methods are conducted in the next chapter. The next chapter aims to 
examine annexation’s fiscal implications by focusing on the role of the land use 
situation of the municipality. Rather than a large cross-sectional dataset, the 
analysis in the next chapter employs a sample of municipalities with similar 
revenue structures, and uses a longitudinal dataset. The information from the 
annual data of the sample municipalities allows us to explore more details of 
annexation activities, financial condition’s changes, and the important role played 
by the land use situation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF LAND USE: THE CASE OF PHOENIX METROPOLITAN 
AREA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a comprehensive perspective of the relationships 
among annexation, land use and local government finance in one metropolitan 
region, to inform a larger debate of urban growth and local finance management. 
It addresses four research questions: (1) what is the role of land use in the 
relationship between annexation and the local government’s financial conditions?  
In other words, are annexation’s fiscal effects conditional on the local land use 
situation? (2) what are the spatial patterns of annexation activities and land uses? 
(3) how is annexation related to land use changes at the municipal level? And (4) 
what are the fiscal implications of land use at the municipal level? 
In answering these questions, a sample of 24 municipalities in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area (1990 to 2009) is studied to test two hypotheses established in 
Chapter 2: H2: A higher proportion of “profitable” land uses (e.g. commercial 
land) in a municipality is associated with a better financial condition of local 
government; and H3: Annexation’s effects on a local government’s financial 
condition depends on the land use situation of the municipality.  
The Phoenix metropolitan area is chosen for four reasons.  First, as a 
typical southwestern metropolitan area, it provides most current features and 
characteristics of municipal annexation in the U.S.. Land-based growth and 
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annexation were regarded as key elements of the history of the Phoenix 
metropolitan area (Collins, 2005), and their nexus with local government finance 
in this area has obtained scholars’ attention (Heim, 2006; Heim, 2007; Ramirez de 
la Cruz, 2007). Figure 4.1 shows the extensive annexation activities in this area 
between 1990 and 2009.   
Second, cities and towns in this area present a spectrum of municipalities 
including large cities as Phoenix, and small towns such as Gila Bend with a 
population of less than 2,000 in 2009. The spectrum of municipalities provides 
various cases of annexations.  
Third, by drawing the sample from a single county in a state, it is possible 
to control certain common factors of the intergovernmental system which greatly 
affects municipal fiscal behaviors and annexation practices. Local annexation 
behavior is authorized by state general enabling legislation. By shaping the 
incentives of local actors to pursue annexation and determining the range of 
powers available to local governments, state law potentially plays a significant 
role in facilitating or constraining local annexation activities (Carr & Feiock, 2001; 
Edwards, 2011; Liner, 1994). These municipalities in the same county face 
similar legal constraints in terms of the types of revenues available, and service 
categories required (Stainbauer et al., 2002).  
Finally and mostly importantly, limiting the sample to only Phoenix 
metropolitan cities and towns guarantees a precise examination of the role played 
by the land use pattern and land use change.  The measurement of land use is 
complicated as will be explained in this chapter. A nation-wide land use dataset 
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with consistent measurement is almost nonexistent. Sampling municipalities 
within a certain geographic region ensures the consistency of land use 
measurement. 
 
Figure 4.1 Municipal Annexations: Area Annexed by Year in Maricopa County 
(1990-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
This research employs mainly three sets of variables for the 24 
municipalities in Phoenix metropolitan area: one set of local government’s 
financial condition indicators as the dependent variables; and two sets of 
independent variables including the annexations being implemented by these 
municipalities and land use compositions of these municipalities. These variables 
with the unit of per municipality per year are assembled in a panel data set from 
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1990 to 2009. The basic analytical strategy is to estimate the effects of annexation 
and land use composition on the conditions of municipal finance.   
 
Dependent variables  
Similar to the models in Chapter III, the dependent variables I use here are 
indicators of local government financial condition. Four indicators are used 
including Per-capita total revenues, and Per-capita total expenditures, 
Operations ratio (=total revenues/total expenditures), and Debt service ratio 
(=total interest payment to debt/ total expenditures). The only difference is that I 
include Per-capita total expenditures and eliminate the Per-capita own-source 
revenues. This change is made based on the expected effects of land use and 
annexation on not only the revenue side, but also the expenditure side of local 
government finance.   
There are two data sources of these measurements: the Census of 
Governments every five years (1992, 1997, 2002, & 2007), and the Survey of 
Local Government Finance (Arizona) by the Census Bureau with a sample of 
local governments in the intervening years. Both surveys provide periodic and 
comprehensive statistics of revenue, expenditure, debt, and assets for local 
governments.  To adjust for inflation over the years, the dependent variables used 
here are all converted to 1990 US dollar value. 
 
Explanatory variables 
To measure annexation, I draw on data from Maricopa County 
Government (requested by email). The original data are in Geographic 
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Information Systems (GIS) format with annexation information of the 24 
municipalities in Maricopa County from 1885 to October 2010. The data between 
1990 and 2009 are converted into Excel spreadsheets and aggregated by year and 
municipality. As a result of data processing, one parameter is used to describe 
municipal annexation: the Percent Change in Area of each municipality each year. 
Table 4.1 provides the general area change facts of the 24 municipalities in 
Maricopa County from 1990 to 2009.  
 
Table 4.1  
Land Area of Municipalities in Maricopa County (1990-2009) (Unit: square mile) 
Municipality 1990 2000 2009 
Change  
1990-2009 
Avondale 37.20 42.05 45.09 21.22% 
Buckeye 81.42 145.19 375.44 361.12% 
Carefree 8.78 8.80 8.80 0.23% 
Cave Creek 22.56 27.89 37.62 66.76% 
Chandler 47.74 59.07 64.36 34.81% 
El Mirage 9.89 9.89 9.94 0.51% 
Fountain Hill 16.74 18.27 20.32 21.39% 
Gila Bend 8.65 29.45 50.53 484.16% 
Gilbert 26.99 46.96 68.03 152.06% 
Glendale 50.07 54.88 58.71 17.26% 
Goodyear 113.94 116.75 191.20 67.81% 
Guadalupe 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.39% 
Litchfield 2.46 2.99 3.29 33.74% 
Mesa 121.02 128.18 136.99 13.20% 
Paradise 15.21 15.38 15.38 1.12% 
Peoria 60.97 153.14 177.93 191.83% 
Phoenix 421.63 476.66 518.32 22.93% 
Queen Creek 10.72 26.43 27.95 160.73% 
Scottsdale 183.03 183.44 184.47 0.79% 
Surprise 60.64 71.67 105.89 74.62% 
70 
 
Tempe 39.57 40.03 40.04 1.19% 
Tolleson 4.46 5.15 5.38 20.63% 
Wickenburg 10.82 11.21 18.39 69.96% 
Youngtown 1.26 1.48 1.49 18.25% 
Total 1356.55 1675.73 2166.34 59.69% 
 Note. Data are aggregated based on GIS data from Maricopa County Government, 
Arizona  
 
To measure land use, I rely on land use GIS data from the Maricopa 
Association of Governments (MAG). These data are available for the years of 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2004, & 2009. The categories of land use across these years are 
not consistent, since the categories in the 2000s are different from the 1990s. Each 
city and the County Assessor’s Office have their own land use codes. MAG 
aggregates data by creating a proper cross-walk between different land use codes, 
thus making a single coherent code system. As a result, the coherent code system 
changes over time. To solve the problem of coding inconsistency, and to reduce 
the dimensions of land use variables, I aggregated the original categories of land 
use of both the 1990s and the 2000s into four categories: commercial, residential, 
public, and vacant (see Appendix A). Since the existing land uses of an urban area 
do not usually change dramatically, linear interpolation was used to impute the 
land uses for missing years.   
By matching the recoded land use data with the municipalities’ annual 
territories on the GIS map, the annual land use information within each 
municipality can be determined. To measure a certain type of land use, I use the 
percentage of this land use in the area for the whole territory of a municipality 
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each year.  For instance, the “Commercial” land use is described by the 
Percentage of commercial land of the total land of each municipality each year.  
Similar parameters are also used for other three types of land use: Percentage of 
vacant land, Percentage of residential land, Percentage of public land. In the 
regression analysis, the Percentage of public land is omitted to avoid multi-
collinearity.  
 
Control variables 
Beyond the annexation and land use variables, four control variables of 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are also included in the analysis. 
Density is a “built environment” measurement which influences the demand of 
public services (Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2008; Edwards & Xiao, 2009).  Other 
control variables include Median household income, Percentage of population 25 
or older with at least some college education, and Percentage of population aged 
between 18 and 65. All of them indirectly measure the preferences of the local 
population, and reflect their contributions to local revenues, and demands for 
local services (Edwards & Xiao, 2009).  The measurements and sources of all the 
variables are provided in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2   
Annexation, Land use, and Control Variables 
Variable  Definition & measurement Sources 
ANNEX Percentage change in area because of 
annexation 
Maricopa County 
Government 
VAC Percentage of vacant land Maricopa Association of 
Governments (MAG) 
COMM Percentage of commercial land MAG 
RES Percentage of residential land MAG 
PUB Percentage of public land MAG 
DENS Persons per square mile (1000 unit) Decennial Census, 1990 & 
2000, & annual estimates 
INC Median household income  
($1000 unit, in 1990 dollars) 
Census Bureau American 
Community Survey (ACS) 
& Decennial Census, 
1990& 2000   
EDUC  Percentage of population 25 or older with at 
least some college education 
Census Bureau ACS & 
Decennial Census, 1990& 
2000   
AGE Percentage of population 18 to 65 years old Census Bureau ACS & 
Decennial Census, 1990& 
2000   
 
 
4.3 Descriptive Analysis 
To estimate the hypothesized relationships, I first present a descriptive 
statistics (see Table 4.3) and GIS visualization which tracks the land uses and 
annexations in the Phoenix metropolitan area from 1990 to 2000. This is the first 
component of empirical analysis.  
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Table 4.3  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable 
OR Operations ratio  1.05 0.25 
SDR  Debt service ratio 0.08 0.16 
TREV 
Per-capita total revenue ($1000 unit, in  1990 
dollars) 
0.96 0.45 
TEXP 
Per-capita total expenditure ($1000 unit,     in 
1990 dollars) 
0.97 0.52 
Independent variables 
  ANNEX Percentage change in area because of annexation 0.02 0.07 
VAC Percentage of vacant land 0.53 0.25 
COMM Percentage of commercial land 0.05 0.05 
RES Percentage of residential land 0.28 0.18 
PUB Percentage of public land 0.14 0.11 
DENS Persons per square mile (1000 unit) 1.624 1.653 
INC 
Median household income ($1000 unit, in 1990 
dollars) 
4.092 1.991 
EDUC  
Percentage of population 25 or older with   at 
least some college education 
0.559 0.204 
AGE Percentage of population 18 to 65 years old 0.592 0.061 
 
 
 
GIS data allows us to identify spatial distributions of annexation activities 
and land use changes across years. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of all the 
land areas being annexed during 1990 and 2009. It shows that the annexations 
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took place extensively in the cities and towns on the fringe while smaller scale 
annexations were going on within the inner-ring communities of the metropolitan 
area. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present the land use situation of all the 
incorporated areas with Maricopa County before and after the 20 years. They 
show that the land use situation changed in each municipality not only due to 
annexation, but also because development that happened in its existing territory.  
This is also a reason that in the regression analysis I consider the land uses for the 
entire territory of each municipality instead of considering land uses on only the 
annexed areas. The changes in land use in existing territory should not be ignored 
as they have potential fiscal implications as well.  
In addition, Table 4.4 presents the land use characteristics of the areas 
being annexed during the 20 years, in which 82% of the annexed areas were 
vacant at the time being annexed, and only 0.5% of them were commercial land. 
It is possible that most of the big scale annexations on the metropolitan fringe 
brought vacant lands to the municipalities.  
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Figure 4.2 Annexed Area in Phoenix Metropolitan Area (1990-2009) 
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Figure 4.3 Land Use Situation in Phoenix Metropolitan Area (1990) 
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Figure 4.4 Land Use Situation in Phoenix Metropolitan Area (2009) 
 
 
 
  
78 
 
Table 4.4  
Land Uses of the Annexed Areas in Phoenix Metro (1990-2009) 
Note. Data are aggregated based on GIS data from Maricopa County Government, 
Arizona 
 
 
 
4.4 Models of Fixed Effects Panel Data Analysis 
The second component of the empirical analysis is a panel data analysis 
using fixed effects models.  I begin with a base model which estimates the 
relationship between annexation and the local financial condition without 
considering the effects of land use. I estimate Equation 1, a fixed effects model of 
panel data: 
 
                                                             -- (1) 
 
where     refers to the four parameters of local government financial condition: 
Per-capita total revenues, Per-capita total expenditures, Operation ratio, and Debt 
service ratio, and I take the natural logarithm of all these four indicators; 
        is the percent change in area of each municipality each year; the     is a 
vector that includes the four control variables: Density, Median household 
Land use type Square miles Percentage 
Vacant 671.82 82.10% 
Commercial 4.28 0.50% 
Residential 29.60 3.60% 
Public 112.69 13.80% 
Total 818.38 100.00% 
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income, Percentage of population aged 25 or older with at least some college 
education, and Percentage of population aged between 18 and 65. I also include 
the city-fixed effects and year-fixed effects into the model to reduce the bias that 
unobserved variables could potentially produce. The city fixed effects (  ) 
should capture unobserved variables that are constant over years within a given 
city, but different from city to city (such as city’s specific government structure, 
and geographic location); the year fixed effects (  ) should control for 
unobserved variables in a given year that are common to all cities (such as the 
national economic shocks, and federal policy changes). Besides, city-specific 
linear time trends (   ), one for each city, are added to control unobservable 
factors that change linearly over time within a city and affect local government 
financial condition.  All differences between individual municipalities, referred 
as individual heterogeneity, are assumed to be captured by fixed effects and time 
trends.  
To investigate the effects of a municipality’s land use situation on its 
financial condition as specified in Hypothesis 2, I estimate Equation 2 as the 
following. In this model, the key independent variables, Vac, Comm, and Res, are 
percentages of vacant, commercial, and residential area in each city each year. 
Since the sum of the percentages of all land use categories equates to 1, the fourth 
category of land use, public land, is omitted in the model to avoid the problem of 
multi-collinearity.  
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             -- (2)    
  
To further address the role of land use in the relationship between annexation and 
local government’s financial condition, Equation 3 with both annexation and land 
use variables, and three interactions is estimated.  
 
                                                          
                                                          
                                                                                                                             
-- (3) 
 
This is based on Hypothesis 3 that annexation’s effect on local government’s 
financial condition depends on the land use composition of the municipality. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the model with interaction terms of annexation and 
land use, all the dependent and key independent variables are centered on their 
means.
8
 The centered variable of annexation          is multiplied by centered 
variables of land use (      ,        , and       ) to yield three interactions in 
the model. This model allows us to see how annexation’s fiscal effects change 
along with the change of the municipal land use composition. These coefficients 
of the interactions (            ) capture the differential effects of annexation on 
local government’s financial condition with different land use compositions.  
 
4.5 Results  
                                                          
8
 Mean centering makes coefficients easier to interpret, reduces the multi-collinearity (Cronbach 
1987), and it doesn’t affect substance of results (e.g., R2 is unaffected) (Young, 2006). 
 
81 
 
As explained above, three models are used to investigate the determinants 
of these four financial condition indicators (Per-capita total revenues, Per-capita 
total expenditures, Operations ratio, and Debt service ratio). Results of these 
estimates provide mixed evidence for the hypotheses.   
Table 4.5 provides the regression results for models with Per-capita Total 
Revenues as the dependent variable. In model 1, the base model without 
considering the fiscal effects of land use situation, no significant relationship 
between Annexation (percentage change in area per city per year) and Per-capita 
Total Revenues is identified.  The results of model 2 present the effects of land 
use composition on city’s per-capita total revenues when annexation is excluded. 
As mentioned before, the Percentage of public land is omitted to avoid multi-
collinearity in the regression analysis. Thus the public land use is regarded as the 
base group in interpreting the effects of the other three types of land use. 
Percentage of commercial land in the total area of each municipality each year 
compared to public land (the base group) is positively associated with local 
government’s Per-capita Total Revenues (90% level). When annexation and other 
explanatory variables are held constant, 1% increase of commercial land use 
instead of public land within the municipality is related to a 2.223% increase in 
per-capita total revenues of the local government. This effect is qualitatively the 
same in model 3, the full model which includes both annexation and land use 
variables.  
Model 3 presents a positive association of annexation and the dependent 
variable where 1% increase of area each city each year is linked to 0.403% 
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increase in per-capita total revenues of the local government. However, we cannot 
take this simple view of annexation’s effects since all the three interactions 
(ANNEX*VAC, ANNEX*COMM, and ANNEX*RES) are found to have significant 
impacts. It is more complicated to interpret the joint effects of annexation variable 
and the interactions. For example, the effects of vacant land use are interpreted 
based on the coefficient of annexation (0.403) and the coefficient (-7.661) of 
ANNEX*VAC. These coefficients show that the effect of annexation on per-capita 
total revenues is conditional on the percentage of vacant land in the city while 
keeping other variables at their means (mean=0). To be specific, the effects of 
annexation is positive when the city has less than 2.1% of vacant land; the effect 
turns into negative when the city has more than 2.1% of vacant land.
9
   
 
Table 4.5  
Results on Per-capita Total Revenues 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
ANNEX  0.0423(0.155) 
 
0.403*(0.234) 
VAC  
 
-0.151(0.164) -0.234(0.159) 
COMM  2.223*(1.228) 2.051*(1.218) 
RES   -0.208(0.445) -0.200(0.437) 
ANNEX*VAC   
 
-7.661**(2.213) 
ANNEX*COMM   24.064**(10.163) 
                                                          
9
 When other variables are held at their means, Ln (Per-capita Total Revenues) = 
0.403*ANNEX - 7.661* ANNEX*VAC = (0.403-7.661*VAC)*ANNEX.  The slope 
between Ln (Per-capita Total Revenues) and ANNEX is (0.403-7.661*VAC) for their 
linear relationship. Therefore, slope> 0 when VAC<0.021; slope=0 when VAC=0.021; 
and slop<0 when VAC>0.021. 
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ANNEX*RES    5.911*(3.132) 
DENS  -0.195**(0.063) -0.209**(0.067) -0.197**(0.072) 
INC  -0.011(0.007) -0.007(0.007) -0.009(0.008) 
EDUC  0.927(0.658) 1.112*(0.601) 1.188*(0.677) 
AGE  12.809***(3.093) 11.491**(3.466) 12.048***(3.412) 
INTERCEPT -7.878***(1.853) -7.238***(1.964) -7.649***(1.919) 
N  274  274  274  
R-square  0.943  0.944  0.948  
Note. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Time trends, year-fixed effects and city-fixed 
effects are included in all models; Robust standard errors of the mean are presented in 
parentheses. 
 
To visually present the dynamics of annexation, vacant land, and per-
capita total revenues, Figure 4.5 depicts three scenarios of a city with different 
vacant land situations: low percentage of vacant land (e.g. 10% below the mean), 
percentage of vacant land at mean (0), and high percentage of vacant land (e.g. 10% 
above the mean). When a city has low proportion of vacant land, annexation is 
positively associated with per-capita total revenues (the dotted line); when a city 
has proportion of vacant land at mean, the effect of annexation is still positive but 
smaller (the dashed line); and when a city has high proportion of vacant land, 
annexation is negatively associated with per-capita total revenues (the solid line).  
To summarize, as the percentage of vacant land increases in a city, the effect of 
annexation on per-capita total revenues declines, from positive to zero, and then 
to negative, holding all the other variables at their means. That is, cities with 
higher proportion of land vacant are less likely to increase per-capita total 
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revenues via annexation. Moreover, based on the similar analyses, it can be 
summarized that as proportion of commercial or residential land increases, the 
effect of annexation on per-capita total revenues increase (see Appendix B and 
Appendix C).  
 
Figure 4.5 The Effects of Annexation and Vacant Land Use on Per-capita Total 
Revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the estimations of Per-capita Total Expenditures are shown 
in Table 4.6. There are no significant effects of annexation or land use variables 
found in all models. In model 3, the interaction between annexation and 
proportion of residential land (ANNEX*RES) is negatively associated with the 
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dependent variable. It indicates that annexation has a greater negative effect on 
the city’s per-capita total expenditures as the city has a larger proportion of 
residential land instead of public land, keeping other variables at their means; that 
is, annexation along with residential land development is associated with the 
reduction of per-capita total expenditures of the city.  
 
 
Table 4.6  
Results on Per-capita Total Expenditures 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
ANNEX  -0.155(0.250) 
 
-0.048(0.423) 
VAC  
 
0.423(0.379) 0.330(0.373) 
COMM  
 
-0.992(2.283) -1.252(2.265) 
RES  
 
1.087(0.832) 1.096(0.843) 
ANNEX*VAC  
  
-8.538 (3.728) 
ANNEX*COMM  
  
-15.363(22.052) 
ANNEX*RES  
  
-10.926*(6.124) 
DENS  -0.188(0.122) -0.215(0.141) -0.235(0.150) 
INC  -0.025(0.019) -0.028(0.019) -0.029(0.019) 
EDUC  0.026(1.637) 2.417(1.676) 2.361(1.658) 
AGE  0.22(7.743) 3.993(8.061) 5.673(8.224) 
INTERCEPT -1.922(4.235) -3.056(4.427) -4.084(4.566) 
N  273  273  273  
R-square  0.828  0.830  0.834  
Note. * p<0.1; Time trends, year-fixed effects and city-fixed effects are included in all 
models; Robust standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4.7 provides the regression results for models with Operations ratio 
(total revenues/total expenditures) as the dependent variable.  Operations ratio, is 
an indicator of a municipality’s ability of financing public service. Annexation is 
found to have no significant effects on the dependent variable throughout the 
three models. Model 2 finds the Percentage of vacant land is negatively 
associated with local government’s Operations ratio, while the Percentage of 
commercial land is positively associated with the dependent variable. Similar 
effects of these two variables are identified in model 3. They indicate that a higher 
percentage of vacant land area reduces local government’s ability to finance 
public services, while an increase in commercial land is related to positive 
changes in local government’s ability of financing public service.  
 
Table 4.7  
Results on Operations ratio (total revenues/total expenditures) 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
ANNEX  0.201(0.244) 
 
0.458(0.375) 
VAC  
 
-0.577* (0.348) -0.568*(0.344) 
COMM  
 
3.180*(2.088) 3.269*(2.084) 
RES  
 
-1.303(0.799) -1.306(0.820) 
ANNEX*VAC  
  
-0.787(2.663) 
ANNEX*COMM  
  
8.862(18.812) 
ANNEX*RES  
  
4.932(5.108) 
DENS  -0.002(0.118) 0.011(0.136) 0.044(0.145) 
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INC  0.014(0.019) 0.020(0.018) 0.020(0.018) 
EDUC  -1.709(7.521) -1.321(1.546) -1.190(1.557) 
AGE  10.528(2.792) 7.446(7.625) 6.306(7.906) 
INTERCEPT -5.925 (4.065)  -4.152(4.178) -3.527(4.379) 
N  273  273  273  
R-square  0.455  0.472  0.477 
Note. * p<0.1; Time trends, year-fixed effects and city-fixed effects are included in all 
models; Robust standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses.  
 
 
The results of the estimates of Debt service ratio (interest payments on 
debt/ total expenditures) are presented in Table 4.8. As explained in Table 3.2, a 
lower debt service ratio is better sign of local government’s financial condition as 
it means less expenditures are committed to debt service, which leads to more 
flexibility in financing public service. Model 1 finds a significant negative 
relationship between Annexation and Debt service ratio while controlling for 
other variables. It suggests that cities with more annexation have fewer 
expenditures being committed to annual debt service, and thus are able to increase 
expenditures on public service. In this sense, annexation has possible impacts on 
increasing local government service flexibility. Model 2, however, doesn’t find 
significant association of land use and debt service ratio. In model 3, by contrast, 
both annexation and three interactions are significantly associated with debt 
service ratio, which means the relationships between annexation and debt service 
ratio are dependent on the situations of these three types of land uses. I interpret 
these dynamics and summarize each set of relationships while keeping other 
variables at their means: annexation is negatively related to debt service ratio 
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when a city is has low proportion of vacant land (<8.05%), and the relationship 
turns positive when a city has higher than 8.05% of vacant land; annexation is 
negatively related to debt service ratio when a city has a low proportion of 
commercial land (<2.65%), and the relationship turns positive when a city has 
higher than 2.65% of commercial land; and annexation is negatively related to 
debt service ratio when a city is has low proportion of residential land (<8.67%), 
and the relationship turns positive when a city has higher than 8.67% of 
residential land. Simply speaking, the more vacant, commercial, and vacant land 
compared to the public land that a city has, the more likely the city’s annexation 
results in higher debt service ratio.   
 
Table 4.8  
Results on Debt Service ratio (Interest Payments on Debt/ Total Expenditures) 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
ANNEX  -2.006** (0.972) 
 
-3.398***(0.887) 
VAC  
 
-0.614 (0.850) -0.140(0.839) 
COMM  
 
-12.818(9.088) -12.186(8.927) 
RES  
 
0.898(2.062) 1.200(2.153) 
ANNEX*VAC  
  
42.184***(7.941) 
ANNEX*COMM  
  
128.430**(45.128) 
ANNEX*RES  
  
39.186***(10.897) 
DENS  -0.603*(0.335) -0.431(0.338) -0.615*(0.36) 
INC  0.027 (0.0586) 0.015(0.059) 0.024(0.060) 
EDUC  -8.761**(3.942) -8.803**(4.113) -9.247**(4.024) 
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AGE  31.114(22.317) 31.805(23.954) 27.709(23.209) 
INTERCEPT -17.104 (12.302) -16.689(12.982) -13.848(12.521) 
N  252  252  252  
R-square  0.785  0.782  0.805  
Note. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Time trends, year-fixed effects and city-
fixed effects are included in all models; Robust standard errors of the mean are 
presented in parentheses. 
 
 
4.6 Discussion  
 The analyses of the models indicate that the fiscal implications of 
annexation actually depend on the land use situation of the municipality holding 
other socio-economic variables constant. The hypotheses are partially verified by 
the complicated findings. First, annexation alone, as shown in model 1, does not 
have significant relationships with local government finance indicators, except a 
negative relationship with debt service ratio. Municipalities with higher level of 
annexation are found to have lower debt service ratio, which leads to more 
flexibility in financing public service.  
Second, considering only the land use variances (the proportions of the 
major types of land uses), local government’s per-capita total revenues and 
Operations ratio are significantly influenced by the situations of vacant and 
commercial land uses; that is, a higher proportion of vacant land is generally 
related to worse local financial condition while higher proportion of commercial 
land is related to better financial condition.  
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Third, the most important finding is that the land use situation plays a 
significant role in relationships between annexation and local government’s per-
capita total revenues and per-capita total expenditures, and debt service ratio. 
According to the findings, a higher proportion of vacant land in a city is 
associated with smaller positive or greater negative fiscal effects of annexation 
(i.e. decline in per-capita total revenues, and increase in debt service ratio). 
Commercial and residential land uses have positive impacts on annexation’s 
effects on per-capita total revenues. This is consistent with the literature which 
describes commercial and residential land use as “profitable” since they produce 
more revenues (property tax, sales tax, charges and user fees) than vacant and 
public land uses. One the expenditure side, a higher proportion residential land 
use is significantly related to the negative effects of annexation on per-capita total 
expenditures. This can be explained by the population increase brought by 
residential land use. Annexing residential land may result in greater total 
expenditures of the city. But since residential land comes with the population on it, 
the marginal expenditures and per-capita expenditures may actually decrease. The 
most controversial findings are about the effects of the interactions on debt 
service ratio. The results show higher proportions of commercial and residential 
land uses diminish annexation’s negative effect on debt service ratio, and to 
certain point change the effect into positive. This can be explained by the 
increasing demands of public infrastructures (e.g. schools, streets and highways, 
sewer and water systems, and power utilities) due to expended commercial 
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activities and population growth via annexation. The debt service increases in the 
short run as the city invests in public projects through borrowing.  
To sum up, annexation has the potential for fiscal gains to local government, 
but a narrow perspective of its fiscal consequences is both inaccurate and 
impractical. Land use plays an important role in the net effects of annexation. 
Annexation’s positive fiscal effects may diminish if high proportion of land in the 
city is undeveloped. Therefore, for local governments, prudent land use planning 
and development along with annexation activities are needed for their long-term 
fiscal benefits. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
  
5.1 Summary 
This research brings insights to the current debate on the fiscal 
implications of annexation. While it is widely recognized that the narrow 
perspective of annexation’s fiscal consequences does not have many policy 
implications, more and more research agendas are set to examine the related local 
circumstances. This study contributes to this agenda both theoretically and 
methodologically. It addresses a significant gap in the literature by examining the 
roles of local revenue structure and land use in determining annexation’s fiscal 
implications. Similar to Liner and McGregor’s (2002) and Edwards & Xiao’s 
(2009) conclusion, I find that fiscal effects are complicated and depend on 
specific municipal circumstances. What conclusion can we draw from the 
findings presented above?   
In both of the empirical analyses in Chapter III and Chapter IV, I firstly 
use annexation to estimate local government’s financial condition without 
considering the effects of either its local revenue structure or land use situation. In 
the multi-city cross-sectional regression models, annexation is significantly 
associated with increase in per-capita own-source revenues, and the debt service 
ratio, while it is only negatively associated with debt service ratio in the panel 
data analyses of Phoenix metro municipalities. These findings show there is 
probably no straight forward relationship between annexation and local 
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government’s financial condition due to the important roles played by local 
circumstances.  
The further empirical analyses in both chapters unveil the dynamics of 
local government revenue structure and land use. The interactive models in 
Chapter III reveal that the net fiscal outcome of annexation depends on the 
municipality’s options and arrangements of revenue collection, holding policy and 
socio-economic variables constant. Municipalities with diversified taxing 
authority and/or with a balance of “inelastic” and “elastic” revenue sources are 
more likely to have improved their financial conditions through annexation, 
setting aside a few exceptional findings. Tracking municipalities in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area across 20 years, the fixed effects panel data analyses have 
indicated that annexation’s effects on a municipality’s financial condition largely 
depend on the municipality’s land use situation. That is, for the municipalities 
with higher proportion of vacant land, annexation is more likely to be associated 
with lower per-capita total revenue and a greater debt service ratio. The effects of 
commercial and residential land are generally positive but also complex. They 
could be explained by various possibilities of revenue and expenditure activities 
on these two types of land.  
Using a dataset of recent decades (1990 to 2000, 1990 to 2009), this 
research challenges the previous theories that support positive fiscal consequences 
of annexation. The fiscal implications of annexation are less predictable 
nowadays. Most of the theories and previous studies on annexation are from the 
perspective of central cities (e.g. Rusk, 2003; 2006; Fleischmann, 1986; 
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MacManus & Thomas, 1979). However, suburban cities and towns are 
increasingly active in urban and metropolitan evolution in recent decades. 
Annexation is widely practiced by municipalities of smaller size, and in non-
central spatial locations. Therefore, instead of only strengthening the central city’s 
monopoly power in financial management and fiscal policy, annexation might 
have helped suburban jurisdictions obtain more power to generate a balance with 
central cities. Annexation’s fiscal implications are also not predictable because of 
the significant roles played by local circumstances which for long have been 
ignored in research. This research is one of the few which underscore the 
conditional effects of local government’s revenue structure and land use situation 
in the evaluations of annexation’s fiscal effects.  
This research also has methodological contributions. To avoid the 
disadvantages of single methodology, this research employs cross-sectional 
interactive regression analysis with a sample of nation-wide municipalities, and 
panel data analysis focusing on a group of geographic concentrated municipalities 
(i.e. municipalities in the Phoenix metropolitan area). GIS mapping is also used to 
present spatial changes of annexation, land use, and their interactions.  These 
methods serve their purposes, and all together present the issue of annexation’s 
fiscal implications and the roles of local government’s revenue structure and land 
use in a multi-perspective and sophisticated manner.  
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5.2 Policy Implications 
The findings of this study are expected to draw more scholars’ and 
practitioners’ attention to the roles of local government finance structure and land 
use, as well as other local circumstances in assessing annexation policies. It raises 
a number of important policy questions regarding urban growth and municipal 
financial management, as well as intergovernmental relations. 
The findings suggest that annexation has the potential for fiscal gains to 
local government, but its positive fiscal effects may diminish if the municipality 
has less capability to make suitable revenue arrangement, and if a high proportion 
of land in the municipality remains undeveloped. Also, the results in Chapter III 
show that municipalities with state required impact reports and service plans in 
the process of annexation have significantly more positive improvements in their 
per-capita own-source revenues, and operations ratio. Therefore, for local 
governments, comprehensive strategies, including land use planning and 
management, public service financing, and economic development policies are 
needed to make annexation fiscally successful.  
This research also raises questions about intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
Annexation is a phenomenon with unequal regional impacts, that is, some 
municipalities may have more and better options of what and where to annex 
compared to others. The question is whether intergovernmental aid should be used 
to offset this physical inequity. Should there be a particular federal grant or 
revenue sharing formula to help municipalities which are unable to annex, or have 
annexed less populated lands with service obligation challenges?  Since 
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annexation has the potential of improving municipal financial condition but is 
constrained on revenue structure and land use reality, should the states loosen 
their taxation restrictions on local governments?  Whether the states should take it 
upon themselves to enhance the diversity of revenues allowable for use at the 
local level is long lasting question of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
 
5.3 Caveats and Limitations  
There are several caveats and limitations in this research. First, limited by 
data availability, one single comprehensive statistical model including the 
variable of both local government financial structure and land use is not 
established. Optimally, the effects of these two local circumstances should be 
included in one model, instead of two separate models, to determine annexation’s 
effects on local government’s financial condition. However, land use data as one 
of the key independent variables are not available for large-scale cross-sectional 
analysis purpose. Therefore, the two variables are examined separately. It is a 
limitation of this study. On the other hand, using the two models can generate 
insights that might not be found if the estimation is restricted to a single format.  
It is anticipated that more robust findings will occur because of this advantage. 
Second, the models using panel data analysis for municipalities in Phoenix 
metropolitan area to some extent suffers the problem of generalizability. Though 
it uses advanced statistics methods with a longitudinal dataset, questions still 
remain for the findings’ applications to broad scenarios. In particular, the land-
based economic development, heavy reliance on sales tax and construction related 
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charges and fees (Heim, 2006) in the Phoenix metropolitan area is not a usual 
case nationwide; also, for municipalities in the Northeast states which may have 
“annexed out,” annexation is not a major concern of land use management. 
Finally, error may also come from the sources of data. Limited by the 
resource, all the data being used are second-hand, and some are from multiple 
sources. That requires the data processing to be very detail-oriented to avoid more 
potential errors. 
 
5.4 Future Research 
This study can be extended in the future to draw more conclusive findings 
which could have profound policy implications for urban development and public 
financial management. Future research should consider the following extensions. 
First, future research will distinguish the effects of annexation in different types 
of municipalities, such as snow-belt verses sun-belt, central city verses suburb, 
and municipalities of different sizes. These types represent municipalities in 
different stages of urban development. It is interesting to investigate annexation’s 
fiscal effects in each stage of urban development.  
The second extension is to broaden the perspective on the effects of 
annexation.  Instead of the fiscal perspective of the annexing municipalities, 
future study should also consider annexation’s effects on the counties or the de-
annexing municipalities that have lost area because of annexation activities.  
Questions such as how the tax bases and service demands change in these 
counties and municipalities, and what are the factors that influence annexation’s 
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fiscal effects to them have not yet addressed in the literature. Another perspective 
unaddressed is annexation’s fiscal implications for the residents on both in 
preexisting areas and annexed areas. Furthermore, evaluation of annexation 
should not be limited to fiscal effects, but include annexation’s effects on urban 
politics and administration, economic development, and also public health, 
environment, and quality of life. Some of these effects have been covered in 
literature (e.g. Reynolds, 1992; Lindsey & Palmer, 1998), but more updated 
empirical evidence is needed. The intention of the research in these multiple 
perspectives will be to have a comprehensive understanding of annexation’s 
implications to the parties being involved in the process. 
Finally, we need to ask what will happen or has happened in the post-
annexation era?  Lang and LeFurgy (2007) regard annexation and governance as 
two options the “boomburbs” (large, fast-growing suburbs) have when they are 
nearing “build-out.” If current trend of annexation continues in the South and 
West, all the unincorporated land will be eventually “annexed-out.” In this sense, 
forward-looking financial management, planning, and urban policies should be 
adopted by municipalities before this occurs. As these “boomburbs” mature, they 
increasingly face big-city challenges that test their governance capacities. 
Recognizing the governance issues of affluent suburbs are different from the 
issues in traditional central cities, the study of regional governance in a post-
annexation era will be an important area of future research. 
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Steps of the Data Processing for the Nation-Wide Study 
 
The sample consisting of 6069 general purpose municipalities for the 
nation-wide study in Chapter III is obtained by processing data from multiple 
sources in several steps. The first step of processing is to merge data of the same 
municipalities from different datasets, including public finance, geographic area, 
and control variable datasets.  
The first set of data is local level finance data for 1992 and 2002 from the 
Census of Governments surveys by the U.S. Census Bureau. The 1992 dataset 
contains finance data for 85,006 “places” (definition of “places” in the Census 
include census designated places, consolidated cities, and incorporated places), 
while the 2002 dataset contains data for 67,168 “places”. By matching the five-
digit Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code of the “places” in 
1992 and 2002 datasets, 29,055 “places” with both 1992 and 2002 information are 
identified. 
Geographic area data are from National Historical Geographic Information 
System (NHGIS) which is based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Boundary and 
Annexation Survey data. By matching boundary data of 1990 and 2000 on the 
maps, the area changes of 20,612 “places” are calculated.  
Another essential part of data is for local level control variables.  Datasets 
from decennial census surveys of 1990 and 2000, and the State of the Cities Data 
Systems (SOCDS) of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
are merged. This results in 24,041 “places” that are identified with information of 
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density, education attention, housing occupation, household income, poverty rate, 
and race. 
The second step is to merge the public finance dataset (29,055 “places”), 
geographic area (20,612 “places”), and control variable datasets (24,041 “places”) 
that are created in the first step. Only those “places” that appear in all the three 
datasets are kept in the sample. As a result, 17,861 “places” remain in the merged 
dataset.  
The third step of data processing is to exclude “places” of improper size 
and local government type. The types of “places” defined by the Census Bureau 
are incorporated place, such as a city, town or village, and census designated 
place (CDP). Since this study requires general-purpose local governments, I 
exclude CDPs, which “are closely settled, named, unincorporated communities 
that generally contain a mixture of residential, commercial, and retail areas 
similar to those found in incorporated places of similar sizes” (Census Bureau, 
2000). Thus, these “places” that remain in the dataset can be called municipalities. 
I also exclude municipalities with population less than 1,000.  As a result, 7,743 
municipalities remain in the sample. 
The final step of data processing is screening municipalities according to 
their revenue reliance situations. I identify the revenue reliance of each 
municipality with public finance data from the Census of Governments (1992 and 
2002). I use mean and standard deviation statistics to determine the categories of 
revenue reliance of each municipality.  First of all, I calculate the percentage 
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share of total revenues from an individual tax source in both 1990 and 2000. For 
example, I define a municipality as property tax reliant if the share of property tax 
is one standard deviation above the mean. Using the same methods I identified 
municipalities which reliant on “elastic” revenue sources including sales, income 
taxes and non taxes.  Municipalities are assigned into categories of “Balanced 
reliance” and “Others” (including “inelastic” revenue source reliance, and “elastic” 
revenue source reliance).  However, the revenue reliance categories of 1,674 
municipalities are found to be inconsistent in 1990 and 2002. To facilitate the 
measurement of Revenue Reliance, these 1,674 municipalities are excluded from 
the model. Finally, 6069 municipalities are identified as the sample municipalities 
for the cross-sectional analysis in Chapter III.   
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APPENDIX B 
MATCHING NEW LAND USE CATEGORIES WITH ORIGINAL LAND USE 
CODES 
  
 
 
 
 
Matching New Land Use Categories with Original Land Use Codes 
New Categories 2005-2009 Categories 2000 Categories 1990-1995 Categories 
 
Commercial 
Commercial High
i
  General Retail Regional Retail Center 
Commercial Low 
ii
  Specialty Commercial  Neighborhood Retail Center 
Industrial Neighborhood Commercial Community Retail Center 
Mixed Use Community Commercial Industrial 
Business Park Regional Commercial Warehouse/Distribution Center 
Office Super-Regional Commercial Large Assembly Area 
  General Industrial Business Park 
Light Industrial Office 
Industrial   
Business Park 
Office General 
Office Low Rise 
Office Mid Rise 
Office High Rise 
Residential 
Multi Family 
iii
 Rural Residential Small Lot Residential 
Single Family High Density 
iv
 Estate Residential Large Lot Residential 
Single Family Low Density 
v
  Large Lot Residential  Medium Density Residential 
Single Family Medium Density 
vi
 Medium Lot Residential High Density Residential 
1
0
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small Lot Residential    
  
  
  
  
Very Small Lot Residential  
Medium Density Residential 
High Density Residential  
Very High Density Residential 
Vacant 
Vacant Vacant Vacant 
Water Water Water 
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture 
Passive/Restricted Open Space/ 
Undevelopable 
General Open Space Rural 
Active Open Space Active Open Space Dedicated or Non-developable 
Open Space 
 Passive Open Space   
Public  
Airport Airport Airport 
Transportation Transportation Transportation 
Cemetery General Transportation Tourist Accommodations 
Tourist Accommodations Cemetery Recreational Open Space 
Golf Course Golf courses Educational/religious 
Educational Tourist and Visitor Accommodations Institutional 
Religious Educational Public Facility 
Medical/Nursing Home Institutional   
Other Employment
vii
 Public Facilities 
1
0
8
 
 
 
 
 
Public/Special Event/Military Special Events 
    
   
                                                          
Notes.  
        
i
  Community Retail/Regional Retail 
 
ii
 Amusement/Movie Theatre/Specialty Retail/Neighborhood Retail 
 
iii
 Apartment/Condo 
 
iv
 Greater than 4 dwelling/acre, includes Mobile Homes 
 
v
  Less than 1 dwelling/acre 
 
vi
 1 to 4 dwelling/acre 
 vii Landfill/Proving Grounds/Sand and Gravel/etc. 
Source: Maricopa Association of Governments’ regional planning GIS datasets 
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Interpreting Interaction Effects on Per-capita Total Revenues 
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Interpreting Interactive Effects on Debt Service Ratio 
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